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ABSTRACT
This thesis develops a basic methodology for evaluating
the non-technical issues faced by a computer system designer
or implementor. It models the political and social envi-
ronment that the analyst and the system must perform in, to
look for potential trouble spots. Some specific recommen-
dations are then made to assist the analyst in avoiding
problems once they are revealed.
A case study provides a basis for the analysis. It
offers a systematic account by an insider of a major system
development effort. The case deals with several examples of
resistance encountered, from users of the system and from
other groups within data processing who were involved in the
project. The organizational structure of data processing
was found to be a major factor in the intra-departmental
problems.
Thesis Supervisor: Stuart E. Madnick
Title: Associate Professor of Management Science
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INTRODUCT I1
Many valuable insights into resolving the problems
encountered in implementing computerized information sys-
tems (CIS) have come from the application of work in other
fields to the problems. Early work with computers was
necessarily very much technically oriented. The machines
were very expensive and difficult to program. Therefore,
they were only used when the value of the computer was
obvious (usually because of the volume of calculations to
be done). At first, the projects were also very limited in
scope, because of the scale of what the computer was
capable of doing.
As the machines got bigger and faster, and the
programmers and support software got better, things
changed. The capability grew for developing systems that
no longer served a single simple function. The easy to
program tasks with obvious benefits to automation had been
done already. Programmers began to develop programs which
took on more of the task they were helping with. The
benefits were not always quite so clear as before, and the
effects on task and the people involved grew. The programs
began to be used to produce the reports instead of just the
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contents of the reports, and now the procram; was affecting
not just the original user, but all of the end users of
those reports. Instead of just Leing used to process data,
the corputers were now being used to store data and
transfer it between beople. First through printeC reports,
then through data files that were processed again by
another user's program, the corputer became an information
forwarder. In rrany cases, this reant that the human
interactions were changing or being cut out entirely.
Here is where programmers began to get into trouble.
Programmers were used to finding ways to make machines run
better. They had no experience in dealing with human
problems that their programs caused. It became difficult
to separate people, processes, and programs. Before, the
computer had been a tool used by a single person as a part
of a system for getting things done. Now, the people were
being rearranged to take advantage of the computer's new
capabilities. The system for getting things done was now
being changed to take advantage of the tool's abilitie-s for
improving on information flow in the organization. And the
programmers suddenly needed more 'people' skills.
The data processing organizations realized changes
were happening, and Systems Analysts joined programmers in
those departments. They were to develop the new systems
for getting the firm's work done, and the programmers would
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again only have to worr" a1out the technical -roblems. The
analysts would develop the package of computer progrars,
forms, etc. that constitute the new system and aid in
replacing the old syster with the new. Ps the analysts
were fitted into the orcranization they became centers of
change in the firr. Their job was to develop systers that
took advantage of the cor-puter as a storage mechanism, a
means of cormunication, and as a processor, to improve the
profitability of the firm. But still, no one was really
concerned about the effect on the people in the
organization.
It was the late 1960's when a real look was taken at
why computer systers failed, that the people issues really
began to cone out. Work from other fields began to be
adopted and brought into use in the field, in an attempt to
make system's theory 'people' sound as well as technically
sound. The earlier work of psychologists, sociologists,
and organizational specialists was applied to recurring
problems with CIS. Motivation, perception, resistance,
reward, Theory Y and similar words and phrases began to
appear in the literature.
Through the 1970's research in these areas has
continued to explain problems; the literature has grown
much richer. But, to date most of the work has either been
explanatory or simply descriptive. A great deal of effort
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has been put into identifying problem areas to be studicd,
into trying to measure the extent of the problems, and into
understanding the problems and why they occur. There seers
to be a shortage of work that makes suggestions to the
analyst about what to do to avoid such problems. My goal,
then, is to try to develop a methodology for the analyst to
use in accounting for these non-technical issues in the
design phase, rather than in a post mortem of the project.
To do this, I have drawn from recent work in political
science on evaluating investments in light of political and
social risk.
Approach to the Problem
In my ongoing work with Worldwide Insurance* , I had
begun to run into many instances of resistance to the CIS
that I was working on, the Cost Analysis System (CAS). I
was fortunate to be working for a person who was well read
in the current literature, and was willing to try out
current ideas in CIS implementation. We had attempted to
carefully follow the best advice we could find for
introducing current technology into the Cost Analysis
System. Many possible forms of user resistance had been
thought about in advance, and we felt that we had covered
ourselves pretty well. Yet we were still encountering
problems, very few of them technical.
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I hoped therefore to use work at 1orldw1ide as the
basis for a look at how one might predict and hopefully
prevent "people" nroblems in CIS implenentation. I was in
a position unusual for researchers in this field, in that I
was already established as an "insider" in the firm. I was
a real part of the development project that I wanted to
study.
There are several advantages to being an insider in
this situation. I was there legitimately, and had
established myself before becoming a researcher, so I
didn't need to justify my presence. I already had access
to people and records I needed. The subjects need never
know that I was anything but a systems analyst. I had
already collected most of the facts that I would need -- my
files already held most of the existing paperwork
documenting CAS. Records were not very good, but I had
most of the old memos, schedules, and reports that
remained, given to me as the person currently responsible
for CAS. Much of my interviewing could be done informally
as a part of the regular meetings I was having with the
participants. And my note-taking in the meetings was
already legitimized as well, allowing me to record points
for my thesis as well as for the project.
The data collection went pretty much as planned. I
actually informed people in December that CAS was the
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subject of my thesis, but not what the exact nature of the
thesis was. It was assumed that the topic was technical,
and I did not bother to clarify. I formally interviewed
several people, but I was able to discuss the system and
its history informally with each of them informally as
well, as a normal part of my job. There was very little in
the way of written documents available that I didn't
already have a copy of, but I was again able to find that
out in the line of duty. With the exception of some timing
questions, the written evidence and memories corroborated
well. I was fortunate enough to find several fairly
complete system status reports among the rest, which helped
put things into a consistent time frame. Thus, there was
never any question in my mind that what I had was as
accurate as people remembered, and reasonably complete.
Much of the early history of CAS came from those
documents, and other assorted memos, etc. that had made
their way to my files. The whole was rounded out by
interviews with Rob West and Don Massey, especially- who
had both been on the task force. It is interesting to note
that no one from the original six members of the task force
was still at Worldwide four years later, and only Rob and
Don were left of those who had served on it at any time.
It was easier to find people who had been associated
with the system since the task force dissolved. I was able
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to talk with several prcgrarmers, analysts, and accountants
who had worked with or on CAS at some point. I was also
able to reach a couple of the oricinal prograr2.ers from the
task force period for their comments as well. Whenever
possible, I took the stance of simply being interested in
the past of the system that I was now involved with. By
asking technical questions about the early system, I was
even able to legitimately take notes at these times without
making anyone uncomfortable.
My thesis thus provides what is probably a more
accurate account than an outsider would be able to produce.
I have had the advantage of first-hand knowledge of the
thinking behind many of our decisions. Thus, this thesis
serves the purpose of providing a systematic account of the
resistance issues involved in a CIS implementation, both
resistance from users and from the rest of the data
processing group. In addition, I have tried to provide a
framework for previewing the non-technical issues that
might become a problem in CIS design and implementation.
And finally, I have attempted to make concrete
recommendations for avoidance of some of those problems.
Plan of this Thesis
In Chapter 1, I have presented the reasoning behind
this project and some of the conclusions developed.
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Chapter 2 will providc the background nece ssary to
understand the case, in terms of the major actors and the
early history of the first CAS systen. To make sore sense
out of some of the problems that came up during the
project, a fairly complete outline of the earlier
interactions is important. Chapter 3 takes up the history
of CAS from the time I began work for the company, through
the decision to rewrite the system. The story continues
with the development of the new system in Chapter 4. I
take a more detailed look at the problems encountered with
the project in Chapter 5, and complete the analysis and
conclusions in Chapter 6.
A summary of acronyms appears at the end of the
Appendix, as a reference in case the abbreviations become
overwhelming.
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CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND OF THE CASE
This chapter will provide the necessary background to
understand some of the problems encountered in the develop-
ment of CAS. It begins with an overview of the firm and a
look at the major actors. The early history of the first
CAS is then outlined to establish the setting for Chapters
Three and Four.
The Firm
Worldwide Insurance is the American affiliate of a
London based firm, with its U.S. headquarters located in
Boston. It collected nearly one billion dollars in
premiums in the U.S. in 1979, primarily in commercial poli-
cies. The firm has grown rapidly in the last few years,
resulting in a lot of pressure on computer services and
other support areas, to cope with the rising workload, and
to expand the services available. The corporate manage-
ment has made many major changes, including corporate
reorganizations, in the past few years, trying to manage
the rapid growth. Unfortunately, a number of these changes
with far reaching consequences (especially for data pro-
cessing) have been made with very little notice to those
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who might be affected, This hcs resulted in a number of
problems, such as monthly reports being published 6 months
and more late, and in a lot of bad feelings toward
management.
The MIS Division
The Management Information Services Division (MIS) has
overall responsibility for all data processing activities
at Worldwide. MIS has its own senior vice president who
reports directly to the executive comrittee. Within MIS
there are four departments, plus an administrative group.
The Applications and Programming department (APD) has
responsibility for all application system development and
maintenance for non-MIS departments. Within the APD
department the current organization is along functional
lines, parallelling the structure of the rest of the
organization. Each programming team is often referred to
by the name of the major system or subsystem it is
responsible for. Thus, the group that I am a member of,
within the APD financial reporting section, is usually
called Cost Analysis or simply C-A-S. This corresponds to
the same area of the accounting function of Worldwide.
Within MIS the financial reporting group consists of about
50 people headed by a junior vice president, with respon-
sibilities for general ledger, accounts payable, various
-15-
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federal and state req>uired finc'ncial reports, insurance
profitability, premiums, claims, and outstanding risk
systems, some workload measurement systems, and the Cost
Analysis System.
The Data Processing department (DPD) provides for all
day to day computer operations -- data entry, scheduling,
preparation, and quality control for running existing pro-
grams.
The Systems Technology Department (Technology) is
responsible for all hardware, operating systems and other
system software. They are also charged with providing
technical expertise to APD when required.
The Systems Management Department (SMD) has a role as
a technical quality control monitor.
facing with user departments, develop
fications for most major MIS projects,
-benefit analyses and post-completion
they monitor ongoing application
performance. Sue, our representative
Worldwide at about the same time that
ately became involved with CAS as one
systems, trying to manage and interpre
(and new) CAS project requests. Much
They assist in inter-
the functional speci-
and provide cost-
audits. In addition
program usage and
from SMD, started at
I did. She immedi-
of her first assigned
t the stack of old
of her time since
then has been spent with CAS, despite her other respon-
sibilities, because of the scope of the modifications that
-17-
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we decided to make to the systen.
MIS at present includes over 300 staff members and has
about 50 additional people as contract procramers at any
time. Despite investments in advanced hardware and soft-
ware products and the availability of a good training/edu-
cational program, the MIS group suffers from very high
employee turnover (the average new programmer will not
remain a full year at this point). Part of the problem now
is that Worldwide has gained a bad reputation in the job
market as a high turnover firm. This tends to perpetuate
any earlier personnel troubles, and makes it hard to
attract needed people. As a result, Worldwide is forced to
maintain a large number of contract programmers to fill
slots that should be filled by permanent staff.
Most of the MIS staff are issued copies of a six
volume loose-leaf manual which describes policies and pro-
cedures of the division. This provides guidelines of
general MIS policy, as well as attempting to routinize some
of the normal operations. For example, standard procedures
for submitting tests to be run are layed out in detail in
it.
Mr. Bradley, the vice president who runs MIS, like
several of the other corporate officials, appears fond of
regular change in his organization. Like corporate man-
agement, he tends to mandate change and only later discover
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what the effects were. A recent exam,ple is his decision in
August 1979 to disband the SMD department. The immediate
response of several users was to create a similar func-
tional unit outside of MIS. One such group was the
accounting area's financial reporting group who took two
SMD people (including Sue) and an APD manager and forred a
new section themselves to replace the SMD functions.
Although no official retraction was made, two months later
some of the remaining SMD people were casually informed
that the group would not be dissolving in the near future.
A less drastic but typical change is the rearrangement
of senior managers under Bradley. In the less than two
years that I have been at Worldwide my boss, Lou, has
reported to five different people. Lou's function has
really only changed once, and that did not correspond to
any of the 5 changes above his level.
MIS Project Requests
The MIS Division is run as a service organization.
Their services must be requested formally in writing in
most cases. There is no billing mechanism for any of these
services, so these requests are really the only way of
monitoring and controlling the volume and disbursement of
services. The suggestion for a project may come from
within MIS, but the request itself must be made by a user
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of the system. For some services, such as a request for
DPD to run an existing program, this may take the form of a
memo. For the development or modification of a program or
CIS, the request is made by completing an MIS Project
Request Form.
Requests for programmr.ing go to a coordinator in MIS,
who forwards copies to the manager of the appropriate APD
programming team, and to the SMD representative assigned to
that user. The coordinator also assigns a project number
and records the project in the Project Control System,
which is used to monitor the status of all projects.
The APD manager and the SMD representative then
consult to determine whether the project is significant
enough to require formal specifications (the informal rule
of thumb in use is that any project with more than 2-4
weeks of programmer time gets formal specs). If the
Project Request Form is not completely clear, then SMD may
either choose to return the request to the user for further
clarification, or to consult with the user and APD to
develop formal specifications. Otherwise, if the request
is clear and complete, APD may choose to accept or deny the
project as defined in the request.
Whenever the intent of a requested becomes clear
enough, the APD manager has a right, after consulting SMD,
to reject the request if it seems unreasonable. This may
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be for reason of excessive resources required, or for the
inappropriate nature of a project, such as a system that
benefits the requestor rather than the ccmpany, a duplicate
of an existing system, or a simply impossible idea. Other-
wise, APD may accept the project for immediate work, or
accept it and defer it for available staff time or other
resources. (In practice, as far as I could determine no
project has ever been forr.ally rejected. Instead, they are
accepted and deferred permanently).
In any case, the user is entitled to a written
response to a request in a "reasonable time". (Again, the
manual fails to specify what reasonable is; normally it
seems to be about one month).
If accepted, the project is then scheduled and
programmed by the responsible APD group. Results of tests
are supplied to the SHID representative, who in turn
delivers them to the users. When all stated requirements
(on the formal specs or the original request) of the
project have been satisfied, the user must "sign off" on
the system. APD then completes documentation and submits
the system to DPD to be put into "production". Once DPD
accepts it for production, it may be run at any time the
user makes a written request.
The user has no option to change requirements or to
cancel the project once programming commences. Until that
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time they may withdraw any request. They are charged
neither for development nor for computer usage, so their
incentive for making reasonable requests depends largely on
the inability of APD to handle many simultaneous major
requests.
The project's status is reported throughout the cycle
through the Project Control System. Various reports are
issued on a weekly or monthly basis, some going to users
and some to MIS, and to all levels of management.
The Cost Analysis Department
The Cost Analysis Department (CAD) was established
within the accounting function in the early 1970's to
evaluate the worth of various portions of the company's
business. They were to look into the profitability of each
office doing business for the company, and the profit-
ability of each line of insurance business. They would use
cost chargeback analysis, which invoved finding appropriate
ways to allocate each of the indirect costs of doing busi-
ness to offices and lines of insurance. Then, profit-
ability statements would be developed for each office and
line.
The goal of the department has remained consistent
through several staffing changes, changes both in number
and in actual personnel. The staff has been made up mostly
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of cost accountants and cost accountant trainees. In
August 1979, this department was reorganized along with
most of the accounting area. Its function was expanded to
include additional responsibility for a wider range of
corporate financial reporting. The staff was increased
back to about 15 and the name was changed to the Cost and
Expense Department to recognize its larger role in the
organization.
Throughout the life of CAS, this department has been
the primary user of the system. The system was designed
essentially to automate and expand the profitability
reports that CAD was already producing. Rob West, a man-
ager in the department, has been a primary user and contact
with MIS since his arrival in early 1976.
The Early CAS
The Cost Analysis System had its beginnings in January
1975, with a directive issued by the president of the
company. That created a task force with a charter to
review existing (manual) methods of allocating expenses,
and where necessary, to develop new procedures for charging
out those expenses. The goal was a fair and equitable
allocation of the full costs of doing business to each
office and to each line of insurance. The expectation was
that use of the computer would aid in producing such
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reports in a recular and timelv manner.
The project team. was formed from the top three people
in the Cost Analysis Department and three people from IS.
They quickly decided that the procedures developed would
indeed have to be automated to be used effectively, so the
MIS staff continued with the project. From February to
September 1975, the team gathered information, reviewed
local and regional office operating procedures, and then
began to develop allocation methods and report layouts.
In October a software house was brought in to handle
the bulk of the programming. They worked with the MIS
members of the team to develop final system specifications.
In November 1975, programming was started using an initial
design that incorporated all of the specifications that had
been completed at that point.
The task force was under pressure to complete the
project, and since the software firm had limited staff to
devote to the project, it was decided to split the project
into two pieces. The first piece would be the part- that
would extract all necessary information from other systems
and format it for use by the second part of the system.
The second section would do all of the analysis and
reporting to accomplish the project's objectives.
The first section was brought back in house, and
several contract programmers were hired to do the uork on
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it.. The second section, which allocated the expenses
according to the procedures developed by the task force,
remained with the software house.
During the next two years, the system was developed
and implemented in two steps. The first step was completed
in June 1976 and offered all the features that had been
requested prior to November 1975.
The second step was to resolve any problems found in
the step one design, and in addition included many enhance-
ments that were developed by the task force during the
programming of step one. At the end of December 1977, the
system was considered to be more or less complete. The
project team had gradually dissolved towards the end of
1976 as the members began to meet less and less often. The
primary users, the Cost Analysis Department (CAD), had
begun to request further changes through the official re-
quest process by that point, rather than by working through
the project team.
Between February 1975 and June 1976, management of
both MIS and CAD had changed. The MIS members of the task
force had changed several times; none of the original
members remained by mid-1976. The new CAD manager replaced
the old in the team. According to an August 1976 project
status report, this turnover had not only resulted in a lot
of new ideas and points of view, but in a nearly complete
Figure 5
redefinition of the original plan. ".eanwhile, there was
continuous pressure from .top management for immediate
results.
Because of tie pressure, there was no chance to stop
and review the program design and make any changes. As
decisions were made about what to add next, the task force
produced specifications and passed them on to IS and the
software house for nrograrintnq. Each enhancement was
fitted into the system as well as possible, but the basic
design was the one developed from the November 1975
specifications. Therefore, it was not easily changed to
accomodate some of the early oversights. At the end of
1977 all of the task force specifications had been
implemented and the known problems resolved.
In January 1978, preparations were being made to put
the CAS into 'production', that is, completing documenta-
tion, etc., so that the responsibility for regular running
of the system could be given to DPD. A list of changes
requested by the user dated back to 1976, but the original
request as proposed to MIS had finally been fulfilled. So,
the system had been "signed off" by the users, to meet MIS
project request rules, and to make requests for changes to
CAS legitimate.
Even before it was accepted, the "live" tests showed
that the system was an operational nightmare, requiring
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massive amounts of r-acine tire, tapes, and disk space for
its monthly runs. The allocation processing required a
final monthly run of 15-20 hours of continuous time in the
computer with no possibility of restarting in the middle in
case of problems. At the same time, DPD was averaqing
about 10 hours between machine failures, making a success-
ful CAS run a case of extreme good luck. The reports
produced were completed 2-3 months after the close of the
month that they were reporting. And there were still major
reporting problems that made it impossible to determine
from where and how expenses were allocated to produce the
final numbers. According to Rob West:
There was no way to audit the results that came
out of the system. The Policy Transfer reports
didn't match the Allccated Cost reports or the
extracts. The prograr.mers called it a rounding
problem and said it couldn't be helped. We were
using a dozen allocation passes at the time, so
the results were next to impossible to recreate
by hand, not that we didn't try. Even our
extract reports had to be manually totalled to
get the base figures for checking percentages.
As a result, the reports were not accepted, trusted, or
used by the offices that eventually received them.
At the end of 1977 Don, the lead analyst working on
CAS transferred to SMD. This was a major step up for him,
which he credited to the success they had had with CAS.
Although he kept some responsibility for the system ini-
tially, he was "quite fed up with CAS and all the people
involved with it". During January, responsibility for CAS
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hod Leen shifte. to a new vanager in MIS (my eventual loss,
Lou). At that point, Tom was the only person left working
on the system. He had worked on CAS for a little over a
year by then. Lou had assigned a second programmer, Beth,
from his group to work on CAS as well. But Tonm, the last
person with any real knowledge of the programs in the
system, left for another company in March of 1978. This
was just before the February processing run. By the tine
he left, Beth was somewhat familiar with how the system
worked, but lacked any real knowledge of the internal
workings of the programs or of the allocation procedures
being used. She was further hampered because the major
processing was done in a single huge PL/l program and she
was a trainee and only knew COBOL.
When the February processing was attempted in late
March/early April 1978, the PL/l program failed, grinding
to a halt part way through the several hours it was
supposed to run, and printing in explanation only a brief
message about an attempted illegal division. Beth- made
several attenpts to fix the program using available man-
uals, but she was unable to solve the problem. No one else
in IIS with enough knowledge of PL/l to help was willing to
try to fix the program. At that point a decision was made
to try to hire a PL/l programmer to help, and in June 1978,
I joined the CAS group.
-30-
CAS hISTORY I1" 3RIEF
1975 January
November
1976 June
1977 December
1978 March
June
August
1979 January
May
July
August
October
November
1980 March
April
June
. Directive creates Task Force
. Task Force begins Analysis of needs
. Programring of CAS begins (stage 1)
. Task Force continues analysis
. First round of programming completed
. Stage 2 prograriing begins
. CAS "Signed off" by CAD
. Tom leaves, CAS stops working
. Darrell hired
. Corporate Reorganization announced
. CAS running, Improvements underway
. First suggestion of rewrite to CAD
. Regular meetings with CAD begin
. CAS rewrite proposed again
. Rewrite proposal to CAD management
. Feasibility study requested
. CAD reorganized
. Feasibility Study results presented
. Rewrite requested, terminals ordered
. User terminals installed
. Interface problems resolved
. Scheduled system delivery date
Figure 6
-31- .
C:HAPTEP. 3
THE HISTORY OF CAS
When I arrived at Worldwide, CAS had officially been
accepted by the primary user, CAD. This does not mean they
were happy with it, only that under the rules of the MIS
project request system they had to "sign off" the project
once the request, as stated, had been fulfilled. And CAS
met its original specifications, however badly it did so.
But, at that point, the February report was 4 months
late and CAS wasn't working. The system still hadn't been
accepted by DPD as a production system because of the
continuing operational problems and the lack of docuren-
tation. Some programs had been almost continuously in a
state of flux since they were written, sometimes with more
than one change being tested at a time. As a result, DPD
had never even been requested to accept those for
production. Reports had been issued from the system to the
eventual users several times, but there remained so many
problems and questiors about the validity of the results,
that the reports probably wouldn't have been used if they
had been timely. There was a general consensus among both
MIS and CAD that although the basic idea of the system was
good, the output, such as it was, had never been put to any
-32-
real use.
The extract programs that made data available for
processing, which made up the front end of the system,
worked. They consistently ran to their normal completions,
and produced reasonable results. The programs had been
changed by a nur'ber of programmers over the two and a half
years of their existence. Some had already been changed by
more than a dozen people, most of those being contract
programmers. There was essentially no documentation for
the programs and no consistency in either methods or naming
conventions. Internally, the programs operated in a style
which was far from accepted accounting principles. Any
data that failed to meet the "rules" of the program were
simply rejected, with no warning message, explanation, or
even totals of rejected data. Bad data, untranslatable
codes, data that failed edit or selection criteria, were
all simply ignored.
The reports, as a result, were typically a few per
cent short of the totals required to match the feeder
system. But, since there were no obvious biases in the
results, and they were only used to develop percentages for
cost allocation in CAS, those errors were accepted (that
is, the users considered the problem much less serious than
many others with CAS). The only saving point about that
part of the system was that the programs were fairly simple
to start and scimehow they still produced acceptable
(although incorrect) output.
The rest of the system, however, which did the actual
cost allocations, consisted of a single huge PL/1 program.
I think the program may have violated every modern program-
ming rule. Trying to work with that program would convince
anyone of the value of modular program design and struc-
tured programming techniques. It is simply not possible to
read and understand several hundred pages of code at once,
let alone trying to follow the complicated logic of this
program. At the same time, it used none of the ideas that
make a programmers life easier. There were no blank lines,
and the margins were all different, yet indicated no
structure. Variable names had almost no meaning, one or
two letter names were used where ever possible, and were
used again for different purposes elsewhere. On one page
'XX' might be a string of characters containing the name of
a line of insurance, and a few pages away 'XX' will
reappear as a counter or a premium dollar amount. -There
was no documentation, either internal or external, and in
addition the program used a number of advanced features of
PL/l that made it even more difficult to understand (such
as the extensive use of pointer variables).
There was a suspicion that the last programmer had
sabotaged the program when he left, but the program was so
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cor.1plicatcd that chanccs are that if he had had the urce,
he wouldn't have bothered. When it worked, the program
required 12-15 hours of continuous computer time and tied
up several disk units and several tape drives. At the
moment it wasn't working at all; something in the current
data was causinu it to reach a point where it simply quit
processing. It had been designed under several assumptions
that had changed even before the first code was completed.
When they started the design process, the organization
was simple and compact, as was the reporting structure for
lines of insurance. The table structure they chose to
build the system around was reasonably efficient under
those circumstances. Under the new conditions the old
design was not practical, the table structure became very
inefficient with a larger, more complex organization to be
represented. Also, some of the simpler processes were
originally combined in the PL/l allocation program for
processing efficiency. But, as those processes were rede-
fined, they often became more complicated, and the logic to
allow them to remain combined became more complex as well,
until eventually, they should have been separated again for
efficiency. But the software house had neither the time,
the inclination, nor the incentive to rewrite the alloca-
tion program during the middle of the project. The extract
portion of the system had fared much better. The programs
were so simple to becgin with that they had simply gron
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messy with chances.
During the remaining week of June and through July
1978, most of my time was devoted to trying to unravel the
hundreds of pages of PL/l in "the" allocation program. I
needed to find out why it wasn't working, and to try any
possible solutions that might solve the problem temporarily
until I could figure it out. I was introduced to the PL/l
"experts" of the firm, but it quickly became apparant to
me and my boss that it was not worth the effort of asking
them questions. They had no particular interest in helping
to solve the problem. In any case, it began to appear that
it was not a technical problem with PL/l as it first
appeared, but a problem in the complex processing that was
going on internally.
Originally, as it failed, the system had given a
message about an illegal division computation. We traced
this to the specific numbers however, and found that they
and the result should be legal. It therefore looked like
PL/1 was failing for some reason. But then I discovered
that the variable containing the result was redefined at
the time of failure from what we thought it was. PL/l
allows you to specify the number of digits to be reserved
for a number, and the result here had one digit too few
reserved.
I began a systematic brute force attack on the
problem, chanring anthine that miTht lead to the proble-M,
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and then chanjing any new problerms that those first changes
had caused. For the most part, this involved increasing
the number of digits reserved for variables. Increasing
the number allowed for the result of the division had
caused another problen later on, when the result was used
in a computation that in turn becare too large. I couldn't
simply increase all the fields, or our already large
requirements for computer memory and disk space would get
much worse (one digit would cost roughly 10% more storage
space).
So I proceeded one step at a time. After repeating
the cycle several times, I was finally rewarded with a test
that worked. Eventually, the method had paid off, and at
the end of July, although I didn't really understand what
had been wrong, the program was working and CAS was back in
operation. The problem had been that the numbers had grown
too large for the program to handle, but it wasn't clear
why. It could have stermed from the data or from the con-
trol tables set up by CAD, but it hadn't appeared until far
into the processing. It wasn't until two weeks later that
I tracked it down to an unusually large (but legitimate)
data item.
By the first week of August 1978, then, the system was
again working. Rob West suggested to his superiors that
they skip most of the monthly reports that were overdue, in
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a single run of the system and the amount that we were
already behind schedule. They agreed that those reports
weren't worth producing at this point. An effort would Le
made to produce a June report more or less on schedule and
to keep up on time delivery fror that point on. The last
week in July a major corporate reorganization had been
announced, but so far no one knew what the impact would be
on MIS.
At this point I was responsible for 3 programmers and
5 systems. Beth was working on the COBOL part of CAS (the
extract programs that provided data to the system). She
was also working on the only CAS feeder system that we
controlled, but that system required little support and had
no requested changes. The other two programmers, Sharon
and Bob, worked on the remaining three systems under our
control. These were vendor supplied packages that had few
problems, but required many small maintenance jobs, mainly
changes in report headings, etc. At the end of August I
went back to school full time and became a part time
employee. My boss began to look for a replacement for me
as the group leader.
During August, Beth began to try and get CAS back into
shape and try again to put it into production. I added a
couple edit programs to the system to allow the users to
make their own changes to system tables. We also began to
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Although the system ladn't been accepted until t:ihe end of
1976, there were several projects outstanding that dated
from the last few months of that year, requesting changes
to CAS. On reviewing then, we discovered that they ranged
from simple report modifications to major processing logic
changes that would correct, simplify, and extend the
system. For instance, they wanted to not only report data
rejected by the extracts, but to be able to correct it and
include the corrections in later processing, so that the
data used would match what we expected from the feeder
systems. They also wanted to be able to trace how numbers
were produced for the allocation reports.
We discussed these with the users, and I was able to
make changes to the system to get two of the simpler
requests out of the way. One additional project, involving
a major change to the way one of the tables was used in an
extract program, was also chosen. Beth and I began to work
out the best way to handle the change to processing. When
I went back to school she was beginning to make program and
file changes necessary to the project. But other things
came up and that project was set aside for a time.
At that point we began to get more information about
the corporate reorganization. It involved reassignment of
most offices to a new regional and territorial organ-
ization. Agents had been reassigned to new offices, and
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the whole change was to be efffective back to the first of
January 1978. All reports were to show the realigned
structure in the July runs. That meant that year-to-date
and other long term reports (such as our own) would have to
have all of their data realigned for all earlier periods to
meet this requirement. Also, because of agent reassign-
ment, much of the source data for a number of systers would
have to be entirely reprocessed. This is because premiums
and claims are reported to the office that the agent
responsible for that policy is currently assigned to.
Since most reports are only at the office level, data files
are frequently summarized to that level as they are first
processed, thus losing the information needed for this
reorganization. And because office numbers in most of the
numbering systems being used include a region indicator as
one of the code characters, many office location codes
would have to be recoded.
This is not the first time this had happened. The
last reorganization, during the initial CAS development in
1976, had been the cause of much of the inefficiency of the
system. Fortunately, CAS didn't have any data to worry
about that time. It had been the other systems that
suffered. Once the executive staff makes such a decision,
it seems that they are unapproachable about changing it.
Our response was limited to persuading Sue to champion a
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proposal for a corporate-wide numbering system. It would
provide a common set of codes for all new systems and
reports, to replace the codes developed individually for
each system. It wouldn't avoid reorganizations, but would
make the consequences easier to bear, as well as making
reports from different systems much more comparable.
The several systems which provide information to CAS
unfortunately each use a different numbering system for
coding offices, lines of insurance, etc. Not only are the
codes different, but the level of detail is very different
from one system to another. Yet in order for CAS to
utilize the data, it has to be matched across systems. To
accomplish this, a number of translation tables are main-
tained. The system then attempts to translate each code it
receives in the extract processing to a single common
numbering system set up by CAD. Since the incoming codes
would all be changing, the cross reference tables would all
have to be rebuilt to process the recoded data. We would
have to wait for the source data to be converted anyway
before we could run the July report. There were some minor
changes necessary to the extract programs to print the
correct headings, etc., but no changes were required to the
PL/1 program to handle the reorganization.
The project to modify the extract tables was put on
hold while Beth worked on the changes for the reorgan-
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ization. But the first week in SepCember, Beth announced
that she was getting married -- and that she was taking a
job on the other side of the state to be closer to where
they had decided to live. I was now the only person that
knew anything abcut the CAS programs, and I hadn't ever
bothered looking at the COBOL programs. Fortunately, Beth
had almost everything set up for the July run before she
left. Sharon, one of the other two programmers in our
group was reassigned to work on CAS. Initially, Sharon was
asked just to figure out the many necessary steps to get
the system through the next processing cycle, from which
order to run the jobs and which files to use, to which
version of which program was correct. (There were in
several cases multiple versions of the programs that Beth
and others had set up for testing various changes. Beth
had made the changes for the July run, but had forgotten to
tell us which version to use.) Eventually, Sharon was to
take over maintenance of the extract programs as well.
In October, we actually got the July report out.- The
size of the translation tables used by the extracts had
increased significantly because of the new organizational
structure. Because of the increased complexity of the new
organization and the larger tables generating extracted
data, the processing tables that drive the actual expense
allocation program became much larger as well. The July
CAS REPORTIUC PAC:KLOGS
1976 June
July
August
September
October
November
December
1977 January
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
October
November
December
1978 January
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
October
November
December
1979 January
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
October
November
December
1980 January
February
March
April
May
. First complete test (Step 1 reports only)
. (occasional tests)
. January reports run
. February and March reports run
. April reports run
* May reports run
. June and July reports run
. August reports run
. September reports run
. CAS "Signed Off" by CAD
. October and November reports run
. December reports run
. January reports (first officially issued)
. February reports run
. March reports run
. July reports run
. October reports run
. November and December reports run
. March and revised Decerber 1978 reports
. June reports run
September reports run
October reports run
December reports run
January reports run
February reports run
Miarch and Anril reports run
F igure 7
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run did complete succe-ssfully, but required ncrrly twice as
much disk space and twice as much computer time as it had
previously. For several months then, they continued to add
more and more to the processing tables each run, in order
to handle the many special cases that had been dropped or
done incorrectly. So, the resource requirements continued
to grow every time that CAS was run.
A decision was again made to skip several months of
processing because July came out so late. CAD's management
wanted to get the system closer to on schedule rather than
have the additional reports.
In October, my boss hired two new people. He had
finally been successful in finding a new group leader, but
Andy didn't know PL/l. So, instead of Andy taking over the
CAS group, a new group was formed for him. He took over
the three systems unrelated to CAS that we supported, along
with Bob from my group, who worked on them (and another
programmer from my boss's other group).
The second person hired was a PL/1 contract
programmer. Marie was hired to join CAS until a permanent
person could be found (and probably also to serve as a
backup in case I should decide to leave). She and Sharon
once again began the job of trying to get the system ready
to put into production. And I again began to review the
list of project requests for CAS. I attempted to explain
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the complicated table structure necessary for the project
Beth and I had started, but neither Sharon nor Marie seemed
to understand. So, I left that project on hold for the
time being and we made plans to begin work on a couple of
the simpler requests.
At the end of October, management announced their
desire for us to run an October report (November had been
the next one we planned on producing). One of the projects
that we had activated required a complete run of the system
with a special set of processing control tables. (It was
to produce a test file for use by another system). We
decided to make the special run for October as well, so
that we wouldn't have to make any extra extract runs and we
would have a normal run to compare totals with. We
encountered a number of problems with the extracts
ourselves, and were running late, when OAE notified us that
one of the files they provide us had not been realigned
properly before. That problem was corrected by mid-
December. But because of our growing resource requirements
and the increasingily heavy demands on the system in
general, our final processing run for October wasn't com-
pleted until New Year's Day, 1979. The special run was
completed the following weekend.
During January we didn't have any projects directly
requested by the users underway. Sharon was working on
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several chances that would be required in the extract
programs to process January.data. These were still pri-
marily changes resulting from the corporate reorganization
-- often undoinq temtporary changes that were made mid-year
to handle the conversion.
Marie had been brought in as a PL/1 programmer, but
as it turned out, she had had a course but had never used
the language before. She had no interest in learning about
CAS, and since she was temporary it didn't seem worth
forcing the issue. She continued the process of cleaning
up and documenting the system so that we could put it into
production. Ily boss Lou and I agreed that Marie was not
going to be of much use to us after the documentation was
completed, and she was told that her contract would be
allowed to expire at the end of the month.
We felt that the operation of the system was becoming
so impractical, that rather than my working on user
projects, I would spend my time on trying to cut the
resources required for a run of CAS. I then spent a couple
of weeks analyzing CAS, trying to isolate areas that we
could improve the system. I read through the code looking
for obvious flaws that could be streamlined, but most of
the code was so involved that rearranging the logic was
dangerous. So I looked for places that we might effect
change, without affecting logic, such as disk usage.
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Toward the end of January, I had come to some conclu-
sions. First, the system would have to essentially be
rewritten to avoid some central problems with the desijn.
The entire systcm was table driven, under the control of
the users. The idea of processing tables, however, had
been firmly followed throughout the design, with no account
taken of the fact that the tables might not be "full". The
incoming data and the flexibility of the users' controls
allowed the tables to be very sparsely filled. Imagine a
10 by 10 table to be processed, with all but 8 of the
entries being zero. If we want to get row and column
totals for the table, we have to look at each of the 100
numbers even though most are zeroes. All of the processing
in the system worked on that basis, except that the tables
were much larger and the calculations, often quite complex,
were performed even if the number was a zero. Each indi-
vidual process in the program would have to be looked at to
determine what rules might be used to recognize that some
work might be bypassed. Or the system could be rewritten
to ignore the irrelevant parts of each table or to not
treat it as a table at all.
The second conclusion was that because the disk space
required was managed the same way, there was probably very
little data using all of that space. When I did some
tests, I discovered that only 5-10% of the records created
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had any non-zero entries (and many of those had very few
non-zero entries). So, without changing the logic of the
program, I could decrease the disk requirements by almost
90%, if I were to write some routines to intercept all disk
read and write requests and manage the space myself
independant of what the program was doing. I could that
way "fool" the program by not storing the record unless
there was a non-zero entry. Then, when the record was
requested, if it wasn't in the file my routine would
recognize that a record of all zeroes should be returned.
In this way, I could save eight of the nine disk drives
that we currently required without affecting the program
logic. Compared to improving the processing, improving the
disk space requirements would be fairly simple. At the
same time, it would isolate all data storage and retrieval
into routines that could later be replaced by DBMS access
routines.
There were some other thoughts at this point. The
system was complicated, poorly understood, difficult to
use, and impossible to run. Many of the problems seemed to
stem from the original design flaws. Rewriting the system
would allow us to take advantage of all the things that had
been learned the first time, everything we had learned
since, and design for all of the changes and proposed
changes. It would also be possible to design the system to
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be run as a series of transactions instead of a single
massive run. The idea of an allocation is to take an
expense that is identified by a coded location, insurance
line, etc. and split it up among the locations, etc. that
we have determined should be charged for part of that
expense. For instance, regional administrative expenses
may be split among the branch offices in that region on the
basis of the total nurber or size of policies written by
each. The processing was controlled by exhaustively list-
ing all expense codes in tables, with instructions for how
the money is to be divided, and which codes should receive
the allocation. Those tables amount to no more than a list
of instructions, each saying "take the expense from there,
divide it up this way, and put it here and here and here."
If we could somehow process each one of those alloca-
tion instructions separately, it would be possible to stop
the system at any time. Assuming that we had marked each
of them as done when we finished processing it, we could
start back up without losing what had already been accom-
plished. As it was, the system was trying to do too much
"in its head" instead of keeping records. If stopped, it
not only "forgot" which entries it had already processed,
but lost track of where it had recorded everything it had
"written down". Ideally, if enough information were
recorded after each instruction was processed, we could
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proccess each indiviually, or in any' size group. Then, we
could have transactions that said "do everything necessary
to report office X", or "run the next 5 instructions".
This would make it possible to break any run into
small enough pieces to make it much more viable opera-
tionally. That, in turn suggested that we might be able to
allow on-line inqiries of the sort that would process a
single transaction to answer a questicn (such as: What were
the total expenses charged to fire insurance at the Houston
office? ). The input and output files were reasonably
small, only the intermediate work space was at present too
large. If all the data were stored in on-line files, we
could also allow on-line access to original and processed
data to replace thousands of pages of reports. Simnply by
capturing the output in a file, we would have the advantage
of being able to reprint the reports. As the system was, a
lost report or bad heading could mean a complete 15-20 hour
rerun; all of the output was printed directly to paper as
a product of the ronstrous final run. The massive-, terc-
porary files would probably benefit from being put onto a
DBMS .
I also realized that development of a new system could
proceed much faster than fixing the old. The reason was
that where it was impossible to get more than one test of
the old system in a week, we would be able to test a better
--J
designed system as often as needed, both because it would
require far less resources to begin with, and because we
could run much sraller, more specific, tests. The testing
situation alone might make it faster to rewrite the system
completely than to make just a few of the requested changes
to the old one. At the same time it seemed that it would
be much easier to rewrite than to fix.
In February, we convinced Rob West and the other users
that we couldn't continue to run the system without making
some improvements. I began to make the changes to use disk
space better. At one of our meetings, we also suggested to
the users that they should consider a complete rewrite of
the system soon, since these changes would solve only the
disk problems. We explained the reasoning for the pro-
posal, but at the time they were more interested in seeing
some of the improvements they wanted than in considering
any proposal that would hold up progress for several
months.
The last week in February we completed the December
1978 reports. A decision by user management followed
shortly to run the system on a quarterly reporting basis
instead of monthly. This was based on the high resource
requirements and long time delays in getting reports out
making any more frequent schedule wasteful.
Sharon left in March for higher pay, leaving me as the
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entire CAS group. D oss's rsponse to her notice was
prompt, and he was ^fortunate
programer quickly to replace
two days before she left. lie
was a good progranmer and was
needed quickly. He took over
the next few weeks he learned
question the way they worked.
looked at the programs to see
began to find problems and
for once to find a PL/1
her. Brad was able to start
didn't know any COBOL, but
able to pick up what he
the extract programs, and in
enough about them to begin to
For the first time someone
what they were doing. He
suggest changes to CAD to
improve the reports. The totals on our reports began to
resemble those on the systems we were extracting from for
the first time. Instead of blindly rejecting errors as
they had in the past, the programs were changed to report
and total the rejected data. Errors in the processing
logic were found that had made some of the reported figures
false for the past 3 years. And he slowly replaced all of
the confused, patched code with consistent, internally
documented programs. When I explained the deferred project
with the table changes to him, he understood and suggested
further changes. So we reopened the project and he rewrote
the programs to complete it.
While I was making the changes to improve disk usage,
I was also able to include a couple of other requested
improvements from their list of requests. We were slowly
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convincing CAD that we really did know what we were talking
about. We were serious about wanting to improve CAS and
were really giving them results for the first time since
the task force dissolved. In May, the system was tested
with a number of changes in place. We again approached CAD
with the suggestion that we rewrite the system, and this
time they were more receptive. We had begun regular
meetings with them in February to monitor the progress of
changes in the system and to discuss other changes that
they felt were needed (many of which they had never
bothered to request). So, when we again brought up the
subject of a rewrite in May, both groups were much more
familiar with the problems etc., that the other group was
facing.
The discussions continued for the next two months; we
were now meeting once a week rather than twice a week as
before. Frequently discussion turned to what might be
required for a rewrite and what advantages there would be
to it. Not only would we be able to include all of their
outstanding requests in the new design, but a new system
would benefit from the latest in program design. These
were benefits to us, as the people who would have to
maintain the system, but also would make it easier for us
to modify the system, so that in turn we could be more
responsive to future need for change. They could run what
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they needed, when they needed it, as well. In July, CD
was not only convinced but presented the idea to their
management officially. The first week of Aucust their man-
agement decided that the idea was promising and requested a
feasibility study for a rewrite of CAS.
In the meantime, it had been discovered in May that
one of our source files had not been realigned correctly
after the reorcanization. The 1979 data was OK, but the
December 1978 report would have to be rerun when the input
data had been reworked. The December 1978 revised report
was finally issued in early June, shortly before we com-
pleted the March 1979 run. (The March report also served
as the test of our changes.) The second quarter CAS re-
ports were completed at the end of July. From then on, the
system was capable of being run roughly a month behind the
end of the reporting month, without any significant inter-
vention from us. Brad and I finished the job of putting
the extract programs into production.
From this point on, most of our efforts went into, the
new CAS. As it existed, CAS was still nearly unmanageable
for the users and for DPD, who had to run it. The reports
were not being used as planned. However, as the former
head of CAD told me:
We thought perhaps for a change we had a system
that we could sell to other companies. It didn't
run very well, we knew it had its problems and
its limitations -- but we also knew it was better
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than anything an-one ele had. 'We had bouc:Iht so
many turkeys from other coraraniCs that I don't
think anyone would have felt any guilt.
Besides, even though managers weren't using the
reports, CAS did serve a purpose. Those reports
were inaccurate, but they were the best we had to
prepare the (manually prepared financial reports
to the government) from. We hadn't planned it,
but those reports had become critical to our
operation. We couldn't have produced any kind of
estimates -- good or bad -- at that much detail
without a staff of fifty.
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CHAPTER 4
THE NEW CAS
The new system developed slowly from its original con-
ception. There were a number of immediate problems that we
faced. First of all, we had a very poor understanding of
the existing system that we proposed to replace. Although
we were beginning to develop some credibility with the CAD
department, Brad was the only full-time person programming.
Yet we were proposing to rewrite in a few months time, a
system that had taken longer than that to develop orig-
inally. If we could do what we said, there was no question
that the user wanted it done. But why should they trust
us?
By now they were fairly confident that if we continued
as we were, that we could and would continue to improve
their system. They were bargaining several months of a
sure thing, slow progress, against a risky proposition,
that we could rewrite the entire system in that time. In
addition, they would have to put a great deal of their own
effort into the project if they agreed to go with our sug-
gestion.
Through the summer of 1979, we met with CAD and Sue
twice weekly and sometimes more often. We discussed in
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detail what CAD felt :hould be in any new system, what they
thought was wrong with the old, and how they might like the
system to handle each segment that we had identified. Our
goal in the discussions was both to educate the users in
what might be available and to get as many ideas as
possible on the table, so that we wouldn't he surprised by
a request that ruined our design later.
In early August, CAD was reorganized and their func-
tion was expanCed. Anne was hired as Rob's assistant, and
began training to take over most of the responsibility for
CAS. Bill and Dick were transferred into the department
from other parts of the accounting area, and were also
assigned to Rob to assist with his other duties. The
meetings became especially important, therefore, as a means
of bringing Rob's new staff up to date and explaining CAS
to them.
Having Anne in the user department began to make
things easier for us in MIS. Where Rob West had been with
CAS since he joined the task force, his thinking tended to
be very much in terms of how the current system worked. In
dealing with him, we had to always be careful to use the
accounting terms he was familiar with, because the data
processing terminology confused him. And we had to always
relate our discussions to concrete examples from the old
CAS (which we weren't able to do easily). Anne provided
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some fresh thoughts, and was quick to understand our sug-
gestions for change. She was an accountant, and talked in
terms that Rob understood, but also knew more about data
processing than he did, which facilitated communications
with us. As she learned about the old system, she was able
to provide the concrete examples that helped Rob understand
us. She quickly took on the role of intermediary between
the two groups.
Shortly before the CAS feasibility study was actually
approved in mid-August, we began the design of the database
files. Because none of us had ever tried to design files
for a DBMS system before, we decided to use a formal design
technique. Lou had seen some recent mention of a method
referred to as Entity-Relationship Modelling (E-R) in his
computer magazines, and located a copy of an article (Chen,
1977) that explained it.
The E-R approach involved separating the underlying
structure of the firm from the data being captured. The
important elements were defined as Entities, and the Rela-
tionships that existed between them were diagrammed. Any
relationship that might affect reporting was included. A
file structure was then developed from the E-R diagram to
allow data to be captured about any entity or relationship
as needed. This allows data to be captured in a manner
that fits the underlying structure of the firm instead of
collecting it in a form only suitable for t.Ie specific
application in question. The result should be a database
that is useable for any reporting needs, instead of being
forced to duplicate the data in a different form for each
application. We decided after reviewing the paper, that we
would attempt to use E-R and see what we could get out of
it.
For the next few days, we reserved a conference room
and spent all of our time in it. Sue was invited up, and
joined us the first afternoon. She spent what time she
could with us until the design was completed (several hours
each day). The CAD staff joined us during our normal
twice-weekly meeting times, and they, Anne especially,
spent a lot of additional time with us as well.
The sessions were very informal, probably best
described as "brainstorming sessions". Lou and I, having a
better idea of what we were trying to accomplish, generally
served the chairman function when it was needed. Everyone
seemed to participate freely, each taking the floor to make
suggestions, explain points, etc. The wall was covered
with charts and diagrams, and we had a blackboard to sketch
out ideas on. We were constantly redefining our under-
standing of the E-R approach as well as restructuring the
resulting diagrams. Slowly, a complete relationship dia-
gram for the whole financial area of the firm was devel-
-59-
opea.
Once the E-R diagram was completed for this segment of
the firm, we began the more technical job of planning the
actual data files we needed to capture the required data.
This task was handled by the CAS staff, and when we had
completed it, we again net with CAD and Sue to explain how
the new structures would work. We then took the final stern
of taking our actual current data files and showing how
they would fit the new structure. By demonstrating that we
could do that, we satisfied ourselves and our users that we
had developed an adequate E-R diagram to meet all current
and planned data needs for CAS.
At that point we went back to a more normal operating
routine. We met with the Database group to discuss the use
of one of their DBMS software packages to store the CAS
files we had developed. Bill Vernon, the head of the
Database group, was present at that meeting and after some
discussion about our plans, he announced that we would use
ADABAS and gave us a list of restrictions he "had" to, put
on us. Since Lou's boss had already told him in a meeting
the day before that we would have to use ADABAS for a file
of that size, the news came as no surprise. We had heard
about most of the restrictions as well in talking to
Vernon's staff earlier. But, this meeting served to make
both groups officially aware of the conditions we would be
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doveloping CAS under.
During September, we continued work on the CAS
feasibility study. We looked back at the minutes of our
meetings with CAD from the past few months, to review the
items that they felt should be important in a new CAS. Our
meetings with them continued twice weekly, reviewing what
they had already told us, and getting new ideas and clari-
fication of some earlier points. The MIS team was fairly
confident of how to proceed, and began to develop concrete
plans for a system to accomplish our goal. We laid out the
basic processing steps that would have to be at the core of
any such system. Then, based on user requirements, we
decided what the initial system would logically contain --
either because they were basic features required by the
user or because they would have to be included as part of
the core of the new system anyway.
We then proceeded to set up a basic design for the
system and developed design rules for individual modules.
The system would be highly modular to allow for flexibility
as well as for the programming advantages. Functions could
be easily added or changed by inserting or modifying mod-
ules in the basic system. The system would be based on the
processing of individual transactions to accomplish the
smallest discrete piece of work possible at one time. This
would offer the advantage of making the system interrupt-
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able. The old proqram ran unstoppably for hr rs reg-ard-
less of which outputs were really needed, and with no
chance to check interr'ediate results. This, instead, would
run only those transactions that were needed to produce the
desired results, split into as many steps as necessary. "e
actually began design and coding of some of the core
modules in order to test out the design rules. We also set
up the file descriptions for the three ADABAS files we
would need, and requested the Database group to develop the
interface modules for us.
' In order to isolate our system from the problems en-
countered in reorganizations, we came up with a scheme for
storing data separately from the codes for the office, cost
center, etc. that the data belonged with. What we did was
to establish an additional set of cross reference tables.
The first set of tables was to translate the codes in the
feeder systems to a common numbering system, for processing
and reporting purposes. The new set would then translate
those codes into an arbitrary set of sequential numbers for
data storage. This way, the data would be stored with
codes whose meaning was limited to locating data in the
file. The organizational hierarchy and other information
in the reporting codes remained separate, so that by simply
changing the cross reference tables, we could immediately
report in any organizational format desired.
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The end of Sctemtber was then snent trying to estab-
lish estimates of how much time and resources would be
required for each part of the project. We split the re-
quested features into several groups according to need,
difficulty, desirability, etc. After establishing what the
minimum requirements would be for an initial system, we
split the rest into three logical follow-up development
phases, and then made estimates for time and resources for
each.
The idea here was to provide a plan that would allow
quick initial development, and flexibility in what to add
next. Living with the initial system would doubtless
suggest some group of changes that would improve its use-
fulness most for the next phase. But we also wanted it on
the record that this was intended to be an evolutionary
development, and would not stop after the first version was
delivered. We therefore needed to document some plan for
future phases and resource estimates, even if they might be
completely revised before we got there.
The last week of September, the feasibility study
results were written up as a proposal to proceed with the
first phase of a proposed four phase development of a new
Cost Analysis System. The initial phase would quickly
replace the functions of the existing system, and following
phases would add on the other features desired. A long
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rance plan to reiace all financial systcms was also
sketched out.
Sue and Lou put together most of the final document
and developed a presentation for user management. It
emphasized the capability and flexibility of the database
design we had developed and the proposed modular program
design. It also stressed some points that the user thought
critical, such as auditability and testability, that would
be features of the new- design. A six to eight month period
was suggested for the first development to be completed,
depending on specific options chosen. The technical issues
involved and specific content of the proposed system (aside
from the selling points) were left vague. It did include a
proposal that the design be considered as a basis for
similar rewrite of all financial systems if it was as
successful as we expected.
The following week, Sue made the presentation to CAD
and their management. When they reponded favorably, she
and Lou helped CAD management revise it for presentation to
the senior corporate officers who would be affected. Ed
Newcomb, head of the financial reporting area, made that
presentation in mid-October. It varied very little from
the original, but emphasized even more the future potential
of the new design, and dwelled even less on the actual
content of the first version. The immediate response was
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guarded, but positive.
During the early part of the month, Lou discovered
Stan at an open house recruiting session, and hired him for
CAS. Stan had no data processing experience, but was
bright and had taken PL/l courses. He looked like a very
promising trainee candidate.
Also in October, we received the first ADABAS inter-
face modules. We did the necessary programming and began
to test the ADABAS routines. It was iraediately apparant
that there were problems, and we requested help in solving
them from the Database group, since the problem seemed to
be in the interface modules. We were told that they would
get to it when they could, as they were very busy at the
time.
Meanwhile, we were making some initial progress with
design and coding of modules for the new system. Since we
had no access to the ADABAS files until the interface
problem was straightened out, we were concentrating on
developing the translation tables that would match the
codes from feeding systems. The tables would be necessary
for loading the data files into ADABAS, since we intended
to use our own translated codes for data storage, and we
would need them to translate the data back for reporting
purposes as well.
Unfortunately, Brad and Stan didn't seem to be hitting
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it off too well, but that hadn't become a real problem yet.
Sue officially transferred from SMD to the new Financial
Systems group as a result of the breakup of SMD that had
been announced in August, but her job changed very little.
Stan was assigned the job of defining all of the systen we
had designed into the data dictionary. We hoped to use
this as a quick introduction for him to what had been
accomplished so far, by involving him somewhat in all of
the modules. Use of the data dictionary system was
expected to further improve our ability to make modifi-
cations to the new system easily, by allowing us to quickly
find all of the modules affected by any change.
In mid-November we were officially requested, by the
Controller and the Treasurer jointly, to proceed with a
rewrite of the Cost Analysis System. We were to follow the
recommendations that we made in the feasibility study
proposal for Phase 1 of the project. They requested that
the project begin immediately and be completed by June 30,
1980.
We immediately ordered the terminals that our users
would require for on-line use of the system. The ADABAS
interface still wasn't working, so we again asked for help
to get it fixed. We also requested assistance from the
group that handled CICS interfaces, which would. provide
terminal session monitor and control facilitics for the
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user terminals. (211 user dcnartment terminals run through
the CICS monitor system, which accepts typed input and
forwards it to processing- programs. CICS only allows users
with proper authorization to run each program, which
provides a good measure of control.)
Design and coding of CAS modules was proceeding
reasonably well. Meetings with CAD were now focusing on
the specifics of what they wanted to see in a given
situation: formats, prompting, etc., and exact contents of
reports, ie, what fields do we need to add up to create
this reported number. December arrived and progressed with
little major to show. We still had no access to our ADABAS
files, so we couldn't put together the quick prototype that
we had hoped to provide.
Toward the end of December, there was still nothing to
show for our effort, and Rob and Sue were beginning to be
visibly uncomfortable with not having any specifications in
writing. Over the next couple of meetings, CAD presented
their view of what they expected in the new CAS. Wd, in
turn, presented an explanation of how the system would
accomplish those tasks.
Finally, just before Christmas, we got some help with
the ADABAS problem. The solution was to give us an all new
interface, which operated somewhat differently than the
other had been intended to. In early January we got some
successful tests accessing the ADA2AS files, but due to a
couple of major changes we had just made to our programs,
we needed to fix the existing nodules before completing a
prototype. We still hadn't received any response from the
CICS group, and approached them aqain. They announced that
they would get to us when they had the time. Lou decided
that we didn't have the time, and sent Andy to a CICS class
for a week, hoping that he would be able to help us set up
the interface ourselves afterward.
Brad and Stan seemed to rub each other the wrong way,
and were unable to discuss programs quietly with each
other. They had had several arguments for no good reason
in the past few weeks, usually about unimportant points of
programming style. More of my time was being spent trying
to provide the necessary communication between them, so
that program development could continue at a reasonable
pace. All too often, each would make assumptions about how
the other's module would work that turned out to be wrong.
The problem was not helped by the fact that everyone
was working at different times. Brad took Wednesdays off
and worked Saturdays, and he started mornings at seven so
he could leave an hour and a half early in the afternoon.
Stan worked normal hours, and I tended to work mostly
evening and weekend hours during school. Because the core
of the system still wasn't working, each person was likely
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to core in and find a program critical to his testing not
working. If the person responsible wasn't around, the
options were to be frustrated, or to try and fix the other
person's code. So it was not unusual to come in and either
find that the code you were last working on had been
changed, or that someone else had caused a new problem for
your testing. Brad was about ready to quit.
At the end of January, Lou was having problems
locating an experienced PL/l progranmer to join the group.
We decided that even a trainee would be better than no
programmer, and he hired the next promising PL/l trained
programmer who applied to the company. Carol was quiet and
pleasant and seemed that she would be able to work success-
fully with Brad and Stan. But it seemed that the tension
between the two bothered her, and although she got along
much better with them than they did with each other, her
working relationship with each of them was less than ideal.
Stan had been elected to write an interactive program
for our terminals that would run CAS, until we could get
CICS help, so that we could try to get a prototype system
running for demonstration. He was still having problems
getting that to run properly. Brad, in an effort to avoid
conflict with Stan, started work on revising the extract
programs to provide data properly for the new system.
Sue had persuaded the group to develop more formal
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specifications for the system. Our meetings were nowi
directed at finalizing those. CAD and Sue wrote up the
specifications together, and then we reviewed then in the
meetings and agreed on any changes needed. By early
February a fairly complete set of reauirements was
documented in that way.
When Andy cane back from CICS class, he understood the
problem well enough to make some suggestions. But we had
to explain the system to him before he could be of much
help. Unfortunately, he had never sat in on any of our
design sessions, so he was coming into this cold. After a
couple weeks of trying to explain the system to him, we
finally just gave him a copy of part of the system to work
with. He then tried to modify that series of modules to
run under CICS. He soon discovered that once he had con-
verted the programs, he couldn't use them because the
necessary interfaces between PL/l and CICS hadn't ever been
used in our shop. We again requested that the CICS group
give us help, but this time limited to providing the
missing interfaces.
However, Andy's suggestions about how files were
accessed under CICS, etc. allowed us to make a few design
changes that would simplify the conversion later. The most
important of these changes was our decision to put the
cross reference tables onto the RAMIS DBMS. This is some-
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thing we had pianned Co do eventually, but because CICS
wouldn't allow the files we were currently using, we
decided to proceed immediately. This required, however,
that we get an interface between our PL/l programs and
RAMIS set up. We went to the Database group for assis-
tance, but they wouldn't be able to give us much time for
several weeks. Instead, they offered to give us the infor-
mation to write our own interf ace modules. With this new
change, we were again without a working system core until
it worked. We had access to the data in ADABAS, but now
couldn't access the conversion tables, and we still didn't
have a working monitor program.
We went to talk to OAL about getting the data that we
needed from their file. They sounded confused, but there
didn't seem to be any real difficulty in getting what we
needed. Brad's work with the extract programs was nearing
the point where he would need that information from them
soon.
Our new terminals arrived in IIS, several months-late,
but the user's terminals still hadn't been delivered. We
continued on with nothing to show for our effort into
March. It was discovered that no one in the firm had ever
used the PAMIS interface with PL/l before, and a module
would have to be generated in the RAMIS system before our
interface would work. Again there were delays.
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The terminals vwre finaily installed in CAD. The
RAMIS interface was established and tested successfully.
The programs for the CICS interface were delivered by IBM
and Andy began testing on those. Meetings with the user
were changed to once a week due to lack of anything to talk
about. Relation-s within our group remained strained; Brad
was again talking about leaving. Most of my time was taken
up with trying to keep up enouch communications to keep the
group working.
By early April we were finally showing signs of
progress. Stan's on-line monitor was fixed, and it was
beginning to look like we would soon be able to edit tables
and a few other simple functions on-line. There were still
a few problems in the programs, but the system core was
reaching the stage where problems were generally isolated
to the function being tested. CICS problems were now past
the interface and in the actual programs being tested.
RAMIS and ADABAS interfaces seemed to function well. It
seemed that we could finally spend our time working on, our
system instead of interfaces with others.
The old system was run for February 1980 and failed
for the first time since we started the rewrite. The
problem was in the allocation processing in the big PL/l
program. When I found the problem, it turned out to be a
weakness in the original rules for allocating expenses, and
it had died tryimn to ;rocess legitimate data.. It had just
happened that that data combination had never before
occurred since hie system was first run. The solution was
simply for the user to change the control tables to bypass
the illegal calculation. They made that change and tried
again, but this time we ran in to operational problems, and
our files were destroyed mid-run. We had more operational
problems for the next two attempts, and then finally a
successful run at the end of April. We then tried to run
March reporting and had similar problems because of the
huge resource requirements. All told, I spent nearly all
of my time working on the old system for a month.
When I returned to work on the new system, I found
that communications had broken down again, and several
modules that had been working didn't work any longer.
Within a couple days, we were able to isolate and solve the
problems. We got the table edits working successfully on
our terminals, and invited the CAD staff to come up and try
them. This is the first thing we had been able to present
them.
The first week. in April, the system was very far
behind schedule, and far from complete. But we were making
visible progress, and all of the known roadblocks were
finally out of our way. Andy finally had a PL/l program
run successfully under CICS and was preparing to convert
the working part of C r systCm. There w-as even a chance
that we might meet the June 30 completion date that we had
originally proiised.
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CliAPTER 5
PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED WITH CAS
This chapter looks more deeply at some of the problems
we had in dealing with other groups in MIIS. The focus here
is mostly on why, from their point of view, these problems
might have occurred.
Technology
The Systems Technology Department is responsible for
all hardware and systems programs -- operating systems,
programming languages, telecommunications software, etc.
This includes providing and maintaining these facilities as
well as providing technical expertise to those using them.
In the summer of 1978, a personal difference of
opinion between the head of Technology and his boss led to
his being fired. Shortly afterwards, a group of his staff
responded to what they perceived as an unfair firing by
themselves quitting. This cut the programming staff in
half and essentially removed the entire management group.
The remaining programmers in the group were very overworked
and, to keep things running, several of them were asked to
take on management responsibilities as well. Many of them
were very technically oriented and balked at being asked to
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serve as managers. ",one were happy with the extra
unfamiliar workload. For the next couple months a nurber
of system problems resulted. As Technology's work fell
behind, the online systems slowed to unacceptable response
times, batch jobs began to take days to get back, and many
ongoing projects were simply frozen because no one had time
for then.
New equipment had been installed by IBM in June and
July and had to be signed for soon or it would be removed.
No one in Technology had had time to fully test it yet, and
no one left really had the authority to sign. None of them
wanted the risk of signing for untested equipment to be on
his or her own head. Reportedly, someone finally solved
the problem by signing the fired manager's name one night
to avoid losing the equipment.
Not surprisingly, under pressure and an increased
workload, without management, and with little but criticism
heard from other departments, one by one, the remaining
Technology staff also began to leave. The firm was trying
to fill the vacant slots, but it was taking tine.
It was early 1979 before the system problems began to
be resolved. A management structure was slowly built back
up, mostly by hiring from outside the company (it isn't
clear whether anyone outside of Technology, with the
exception of two DPD people who actually took positions,
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werc offered a Chincic to rove into the department.
However, no such offer was ever made public). The staff
remaining within Technology without exception refused any
offers made to them. All who were offered advancement to
management emphatically refused. The reasons they sug-
gested to me were: 1) they were technicians and didn't
want to be managers, and 2) they didn't want their necks on
the chopping block. Trhe managors seemed to pick up most
of the blame for any problems, and most of them had had
enough of being the scapegoats.
Toward the summer of 1979 there were rumors about in
the MIS division that a third mainframe computer was being
ordered. And, in fact, in early October a new machine was
installed. It was bigger and faster than the two existing
machines and was to be dedicated to testing. It was
assumed by the Technology staff that such a large increase
in computer resources, nearly doubling existing capacity,
would solve many of the problems of long online response
times and unacceptable batch turnaround tines. It was the
simplest solution to a pressing problem, and the argument
convinced the people who controlled the funds. (A pool was
started in APD betting on the number of days it would take
for the new machine to be as saturated as the old.)
It helped for about a month. The programmers quickly
began to do more work, taking advantage of the improvements
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to Su;mit more tts, zi h the hope of seeing results in a
reasonable time. The online environment improved so that
in the same amount of time using a terminal they could rake
more requests of the machine. Very soon, all three
machines were full to capacity and the problems returned.
New measures were called for.
There had been an informal online users group for the
past couple of years. It consisted of several of the
junior managers in APD who had people trying to do online
program development. They had met regularly with each
other to discuss ways that the testing resources could be
used more effectively, especially with the goal of im-
proving system responsiveness. They believed that such an
improvement would in turn improve proqramer productivity.
They had sent memos and occasionally met with the
Technology group to suggest things that they had come up
with. But, until late 1979, the group had not received
much enthusiasm from Technology. The group hadn't yet been
able to push through any significant changes. However,
with the change of staff in Technology and the growing
pressure for solution of the system problems, the user
group was suddenly taken more seriously. They began having
weekly meetings with Technology staff towards the end of
December 1979.
One of the first results was a plan to try puttinc- a
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terr:.inal on every progjrarmecr' s desk. The online usage
would be restricted to make -only the most efficient com-
mands available to programrIers. It was felt that putting
terminals on every desk would encourage prograrmers to
reduce their usage of printed output and cut back on many
other wasteful testing practices (such as submitting sev-
eral versions of a single test at once, so that when
results were finally returned there was some hope of having
a solution among then). The hope was, that although online
usage would be greatly increased, there would be more
efficient use of available resources and an overall drop in
the load on the computers.
CAS was chosen as a pilot group for testing the
concept. This was because we were beginning a major devel-
opment effort; because we were believed to be heavy but
intelligent users of the system already; and because our
manager was the ringleader of the user group that suggested
it. Our terminals were scheduled to be installed at the
end of December 1979. A few other programmers were also
selected for the pilot group, on roughly the same basis
(especially that their managers were part of the user
group).
Due to technical problems encountered in setting up
the necessary hardware and software for the test, the
Technology group was unable to get everything ready to
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support the new t r-,Ils until late Fcbruar-. IEM, as it
turned out, was unable to deliver all of the necessary
hardware until the first week of February aryway. When
installed, the test group terrminals more than doubled the
number of terminals connected to the test machine.
In January, when our user's terminals were scheduled
to be installed, we contacted Technology to find out what
the status of those terminals was and discovered that they
had "forgotten" to order them. In fact, they had forgotten
to order terminals that had been ordered for several other
user departments as well. It appears that they had decided
that a moratorium on user terminals was called for until
the effect of the new programmer terminals was determined
(even though the user terminals were intended to Le
connected to an entirely different machine!).
They imnediately ordered the missing terminals when
they "discovered" their mistake, but by that point IBM was
backlogged on orders. It seemed unlikely that we would
have terminals for users until late May at least. However,
just a few weeks later, it was noticed by an SMD manager
that some of the programmer terminals were being replaced
with newer models. It was "suggested" that the Technology
department install the old terminals temporarily in the
user departments rather than send them back to IBM.- This
was done in early March.
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Considerinc the problens that Technology faced already
with extremely heavy machine usage, it isn't too surprising
that they might be reluctant to install more terminals in
user sites. Where programmer terminals might conceivably
reduce the machine load,
user application would, e
terminals. There was an
after the forgotten order
to officially halt the
postponement on the basis
information to adequately
systems, or the resources
them. Although they had
October when we made it,
it was very unlikely that any new
specially if it required online
attempt made in January, shortly
was brought to their attention,
installations. They wanted a
that they didn't have enough
assess the impact on existing
that would be required to support
initially approved our request in
they didn't feel that they could
go ahead with installation of our users' terminals until we
had better explained what facilities we had planned on
providing through the terminals and what volume of usage we
envisioned. But, when we were able to immediately provide
that information, they dropped the effort to halt our- user
terminals.
OAE
The OAE group, like CAS, is a financial reporting
group within APD. They are responsible for one of the
company's most important internal operating documents, the
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Operations 7.nalvsis E:hibit. t is a 'IMnthly report that
matches premium income and claims against policies to show
underwriting profitability of agents and local offices.
The system accounts for many of the complexities of the
insurance business (such as the practice of selling por-
tions of policies to other firms to spread the risk), and
it carries a lot of highly detailed information to provide
a number of reports showing office workloads, etc.
The reports that it generates are used by many
managers to measure and monitor performance. Because of
the system's size and perceived complexity, CAE is fairly
well respected by those in MIS. The significance of the
reports and their good record for on-schedule delivery of
reports each month means that they are also well regarded
outside MIS as well.
The OAE group provides 3 tape files to CAS each month.
These 3 files, along with 3 additional files from other
systems, together provide all of the information necessary
to allocate costs within CAS.
We approached the OAE group about the availability
of additional information from their master file during the
course of our feasibility study. Our needs at that time
were fairly vague and the contact was obviously due to a
feasibility study. We made it clear that we were simply
gathering information rather than intending to use the
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results in the- near future. Thcir responses were vcry
positive; yes, the information we wanted was available
from their files, and yes, they could provide it for us
without too much effort or warning. Since our mission was
simply to get needed facts, we did not think to document
the conversations. We simnly incorporated our findings
that the required information was easily available into our
planning.
I think it was Rob West who, during the database de-
sign sessions, suggested that it was beginning to look like
we could take over OAE. The files would include much of
the OAE data anyway, and our design included the necessary
provisions to duplicate much of the OAE processing to pro-
duce some of our reports. The MIS people present probably
took it more seriously than he did, because technically it
really did seem feasible. The suggestion was laughed off
at the time, but was brought back up several more times in
the following months. Sue, our SMD representative com-
mented that that was how empire building was accomplished
in organizations, by gradually replacing other groups. The
original suggestion was revived yet again in March 1980,
when we began having problems getting the cooperation of
the OAE group.
In January of 1980, we went back to OAE looking for
help in finalizing plans to use the additional information.
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Ue needed file nar;es and descriptions, etc., from them.
Brief discussions were carried on over the next two months
between OAE and CAS. Their resronscs to us seemed to
change from day to day. But, as yet no one was bothering
to record exactly what was agreed on in the meetings.
We slowly began to realize that from one meeting to
the next the files that they recommended that we use would
change, that we didn't know exactly how many files thay had
or what exactly was in any of them. We were dealing almost
exclusively with one person, Jerry, who was a senior
programmer in the group. Jerry seemed to have a better
knowledge of their system overall than anyone else that we
had dealt with. Still, it seemed that either we were
getting a runaround or he didn't really understand what we
needed.
He had once suggested that we use his source file and
duplicate all of the daily processing done by their system,
as necessary, to produce what we needed. At other times,
he insisted that it would be far more practical to use an
appropriately summarized and processed file, with monthly
or daily data. Yet other times it seemed best to him that
we duplicate a small part of their processing to use .a file
at a much more "appropriate" level of detail. The possible
files at that level of detail as he described them seemed
somehow to have the same detail as the most detailed and
also as the least
Finally, the
sat in on some of
enough was enough,
of each meeting as
memo to Jerry and
ested.
cetailed.
first week in March, Sue (who had also
our meetincs with OAE) decided that
and started recording her understanding
it was held. She sent the resulting
several managers who might be inter-
Two weeks later (and two memos later), we had a ten-
tative set of files, their contents, and a description of
which processing exactly we would have to duplicate to get
our extracted information to the right level of detail,
etc. But, suddenly Jerry was unable to find a half hour to
meet with us "because of the heavy demand" for his time.
So we were again being held up; we had almost enough infor-
mation to write specifications for the extraction of the
new data, but not quite enough without talking to Jerry
again.
From their point of view, it now seems obvious why
they would not be too eager to help us. The OAE system was
a large, many faceted systera. It provides several critical
corporate reports and has always performed reliably. The
system supports a large number of programmers, and it
commands priorities over MIS resources because of the
importance of its output. As a result, the programrmers in
the group enjoy a certain amount of prestige in the MIS
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orcanization. That teir syster runs well is :lSo i7r[or-
tant in a shop where many of the systens have major bugs
and/or operational problems.
We essentially came to them asking for their help,
having nothing to offer them in return. If our system is a
success, we will get the credit; if it should fail, we take
the blame. The OAE group might get some credit if we were
to request them to do the programming to provide the new
data, but it would be a small, rather unimportant project
that they would get credit for. Otherwise, their time and
effort in helping us would officially get them no credit
whatsoever.
Meanwhile, we were asking to take a part of their
system. At the very least, we would be copying more of
their master file than at present, and we even discussed
going back to their source data and duplicating a signi-
ficant part of their system. That would be valuable to us,
since we would get the data a month earlier and could skip
a number of processing steps that they require. Without
adding a lot of overhead to our system we would be able to
start processing their inputs to our system three weeks
earlier, making the timely production of our reports more
likely.
But, in doing so, we would not only reduce our depen-
dence on OAE, but we would have an opportunity to show them
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up by publishing our reports before their own were ready.
Because we were using advanced programming techniques that
their systen did not incorporate, we also might demonstrate
how inefficient their system is. Although the plan to use
CAS as a first test before converting all financial
applications had not been widely publicized, it is quite
possible that there had been rurors about it. And, if we
were to fail, their system would remain untouched. But if
we did well, their system would be demonstrated to be a
good candidate for conversion, because we would be dupli-
cating part of it anyway.
The Data Base Group
The database group in MIS has responsibility for all
database management systems (DBMS) and the data dictionary.
This is the largest group in APD without a corresponding
function outside of MIS. They are responsible for pro-
viding interface modules, maintaining the integrity of all
DBMS files, assistance in design efforts to put these
facilities to proper use, and maintenance of the DBMS and
data dictionary software.
Bill Vernon, the head of the group, is a senior
manager (VP level). le is widely considered to be bril-
liant, but most people in MIS seem to find him obnoxious
and difficult to deal with. He apparantly is a good
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problem solver to h. c around in a crisis (which r-aV
explain his power in MIS), but otherwise tends to spend
more time at lunch than he does workincg. The group, like
most of MIS has had major turnover problems; very few of
them have been with the company for more than one year.
Our dealincs with the database group have been pretty
successful in general. There have been a lot of delays
because their workload is heavy, but the individuals that
we have dealt with (aside from Vernon) have been friendly
and helpful. There was one problem period in September
1979'when Vernon himself decided to write an interface
program that we needed. It didn't work, and he wouldn't
fix it or give it to one of his staff to work on. We were
unable to get the information from him that was necessary
for us to fix it ourselves. However, one of his staff came
to the rescue, suggesting that we try a new type of
interface that she wanted a chance to test. Although there
was a longer learning period involved for us than we had
hoped for, this averted a major holdup, and by using- the
new interface we were able to deal directly with her from
that point on.
Some of the more interesting interactions with the
database group have been indirect. Our decision to use the
ADABAS DBMS to store our data was essentially ordered by
our senior management. Apparantly the basis for the deci-
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sion was a study dcne at son'-e tim.e in the past (the data-
base staff members I asked were unaware of any such study
in the last two years -- the longest any of them has been
at Worldwide -- but agreed that the choice was appropriate
from what they knew. But, since both the available DBMS's
are updated several times each year, the results of such a
study could be quite wrong by now anyway.)
Of the restrictions placed on our use of ADABAS,
some, such as tie number of files we were allowed to use,
were seemingly arbitrary decisions offered by our managers.
Most'often such rules seemed to have originated from the
head of the database group, even though we didn't hear
about them from him. For instance, we were warned earlier
by one of his staff that Vernon would not allow us to
use more than 3 or 4 files, but the actual restriction was
placed on us in a meeting with the manager above him.
The important thing here is that these decisions were
made for us without any real knowledge of what we were
trying to do or how. They were handed to us as mandates.
Yet, when we asked the people in the database group later,
there seemed to be logical explanations for the decisions
(some made with incomplete knowledge however). But, we had
not been offered explanations at the time; they were
management decisions as far as we were concerned, and we
simply had to design around them.
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CONCLUSIONS
We tried a new (to the corpany) approach in project
design. The standard procedure was for SMD to develop
formal specifications bascd on the project request (and
supplemental work with the requesting department when
necessary). Then the programning group would work directly
from the completed specifications to complete the project.
We, however, attempted to begin work without any preset
specifications to restrain the design. The idea was to
give them a "quick and dirty" prototype system that solved
some of their problems as soon as possible, and then to use
that as a basis for further discussion. We could then
evolve a design that met their needs, and then go back and
"clean up" the programs in each section as the design
became finalized.
This was attempted for several reasons. First;' the
project was not well enough understood by either us, SMD,
or the users to provide detailed specifications. Rob West
had the best knowledge of the old system, and probably the
best idea of what was wrong with it from the user point of
view. But his long exposure to the old system had narrowed
his perception of possible improvervents. Anne, and Rob's
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other new people, hacd sore good ideas but, like the 'IS
staff, had little understanding of the complications of
cost allocation. The MI. staff had many ideas aLout how to
improve the interface with the user, making the system
easier to work with. We also had ideas about specific
technical improvements, such using a DDMS to improve disk
usage, to solve known operational problems. But we really
didn't know what the processing; steps in CAS were. No one
person had the complete picture.
The mechanisms of processing data, etc. still needed
to be worked out, and the options available for handling
inputs and outputs needed to be explored. We hoped that
our approach would help speed up the process of finalizing
the system design. On our side, it seemed like the only
way to give the users an idea of what we might be able to
produce so that they in turn could make reasonably informed
choices between options we might suggest.
By giving them something to work with, we hoped to
encourage insights and suggestions before the design of the
system became fixed. Rather than explain, we would be able
to show; we could test their ideas instead of forcing then
to live with them. It would also be a vehicle to encourage
user participation in the design. It seemed otherwise very
difficult to develop much user participation in a project
requiring as much technical sophistication as this would.
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This would force the issue. There 7culC be no chance for
them to be frustrated by a "fixed" design; the design
would not be fixed until they were satisfied with it, and
there would be no finalized specifications put into writing
until the function was tried in the system. Only the broad
system requirements contained in the oricinal feasibility
study description were to be required from the start.
Besides benefits of their learning, with this approach we
would also be in a much better learning position ourselves.
We could hope to have an understanding of their needs
before we comitted ourselves to impractical goals.
The users accepted the approach pretty well. They
were uncomfortable with not having any preset guidelines to
measure the results by, but they did like the idea of par-
ticipating in the evolution of a system that truly met
their needs. Management accepted the expediency argument
for beginning without complete specifications as teing
reasonable, if not ideal.
But, we were unable to follow through on our part.
Because of the many technical problems encountered we
didn't manage to develop a prototype in the time we had
hoped. The system itself wasn't too difficult, but there
were many untried interfaces with other systems which were
necessary to connect together all of the pieces that we
wanted to utilize. Unfortunately, we 'ran into problems
with every one of those interfaces. This causei r-any long
delays.
Although we had been trying for early Noverber, with
the many problems, we were unable to deliver anything until
March. In January, it became apparant that manager-ent was
getting edgy about not havinT either specifications or
results. SMD and Sue (who by that time had left SMD to
take her new position) began to push for rore written
specifications to resolve the problem. The minutes of some
of our meetings were reworked as the basis for more com-
plete written documentation. During January and February
the meetings between the two departments were used almost
exclusively to discuss problem areas and work up written
requirements for the system.
By the end of MLarch, the users and management were
more comfortable with our progress because fairly detailed
system requirements had been completed. They now had a
much better idea of what to hold against us if we didn't
deliver a working system on time. But we still had essen-
tially nothing working, and our progranning team had no
idea in many cases of how we should approach meeting those
needs. The programmers were beginning to grow very uncom-
fortable with our progress, just as we were beginning to
resolve all of the many interface problems so that we could
finally begin to work on the system itself.
In this case, we successfully introduced the idea of
the change. We bypassed most of the forral design /devel-
opr-ent recuirerents. But by failing to deliver, we jeopar-
dized our chance of doing so again in the future. We ended
up reinforcing their preference for the official system
instead of the change we were attempting to introduce.
Clearly, it would have been seen as a much more promising
technique if we had done a better job of planning its
introduction. By investigating the problems beforehand,
we might have come up with a more reasonable schedule (or
more reasonable promises).
We would have had trouble here if we hadn't tried to
change the standard methods of system development. I don't
believe that we could have completed the design work alone
in six months, if we had done everything by the book.
Aside from the problems inherent in fixing the specifi-
cations before providing any feedback, we simply didn't
know enough when we started to write them.
The users were hampered by having a lot of experience
with a poorly designed system, and very little idea of what
might be done to replace it. Our SMD representative, being
both new and non-technical, didn't understand the system
being replaced or the technical issues involved in
replacing it. And the APD staff was likewise short on
understanding of the old system. While we understood what
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features we could offer the user, if we had comoletcd
programming specifications without any experimentation, the
resulting systevm probably wouldn't have worked. Any inno-
vative system design is likely to suffer from such an
initial shortage of specific knowledge and skills. But if
we failed to meet our promises, it was very unlikely that
we would be given a second chance at using this development
technique.
Just selling the project to the user in the first
place required some understanding of their resistance.
They'had had poor experience with the MIS staff in the
past, with unfulfilled promises and unexplained problems.
The existing system had technical problems that they had
been told repeatedly that they would have to live with --
from lack of auditability, to difficulty of use, to oper-
ational problems. Rob West had a relatively poor under-
standing of data processing, but had picked up a lot of
"facts" from previous MIS people that he had dealt with.
MIS had never been able to solve the problems that CAD. saw
with the system, apparantly using technical "facts" as an
excuse for anything they couldn't program. We then came
in, offering to do things which seeried more difficult to
the users than projects others had failed at. In addition,
we offered things that they had been told explicitly
couldn't be done. We clearly had to establish our believ-
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ability.
At the same time, our suggestions for a new system
posed a threat. CAD, particularly Rob, had helped develop
the original systen, and: had worked hard to understand and
use the system well. It was far from ideal, but by the
time we arrived, they were comfortable with it.
Our proposals to replace the complicated tables that
controlled the CAS processing with a greatly sirplified
mechanism scared the,. They were used to doing things for
the machine, instead of it doing things for them, and they
really didn't trust us. They "understood" how the machine
was performing its part now. By simplifying their interac-
tion with the programs, we reduced their perceived control
over the system, even though their actual control would be
increased. But also, we were taking away their job se-
curity, saying in effect, "now anyone can use the system".
None of us at the time, I'm sure, explicitly recog-
nized any reasons for the users' reluctance to change the
old system. But we were building on trust through good
performance on other projects, and met resistance with
education. Our meetings served to give them exposure to
many of our ideas about what could be done to improve on
their system. We explained many of the technical issues as
best we could in non-technical terms, and explained the
value to them, as well as to us, of such. things as database
systens and modular decsigjn. The meetings also helped us
get to know each other, so that we were quicker to recog-
nize when some point wasn't being fully understood or
accepted. We would, whenever that happened, try to create
an example for the issue in question. Then we would
demonstrate how it micht be handled, and relate that back
to how it would work in the old CAS.
We also tried, as a general practice, to emphasize the
importance of the users to the project. We couldn't write
the system without incorporating their knowledge about how
it should work. Likewise, they wouldn't be able to use the
system effectively without fully understanding what it
could do and how it would do it. The idea was that we
wanted to provide them with a better tool, so that they
might do their job better.
Internal Problems
Our dealings with the users were clearly far more
successful than our dealings with other groups within MIS.
We planned our work with the users pretty well, taking heed
of the current literature on CIS implementation. But we
failed to make the logical extension and worry as much
about the problems of interaction with other MIS groups.
Yet the problems of dealing with the user were for us, at
least, far easier than those of dealing with MIS.
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Once we had convinced thenl that a new CAS would be
worthwhile, we had something our users wanted. They stood
to gain from naking the project successful, and obviously
understood that, since they requested us to do the project.
CAS itself would be their reward.
Our system, however, needed support fron several MIS
groups as well. We needed the cooperation of the five
systems feeding CAS, and specializecl support for each of
the technical features, like ADABAS, that we incorporated.
But there was no incentive for the MIS groups to aid us.
The reward system in MIS will reward only us for the
completion of our project, regardless of how many people in
other groups contributed to that success. And if we fail,
it is only we who fail. There was no inherent incentive
for them to help. In fact, in a case like OAE, the poten-
tial threat posed by our success provided an incentive for
them to help us fail.
Jerry, in OAE, whether consciously or unconsciously,
seems to have found a perfect strategy for protecting his
system from encroachnent from other systems. By making
everything look easy while we are in the planning stages,
he encourages us to plan for an easy task. Later, when we
are under the optimistic schedule we were deluded into
setting up, he delays until we fall behind schedule and our
project fails. If that delay is not enough to hurt us, we
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may still fail lecause the actual work involved is likel7
to turn out to be much more.than we estimated.
We were fortunate that the inforration we cot from OAE
was not required for Phase I of the CAS rewrite, but simply
something we had hoped to throw in then, if possible. When
Phase II is planned, we'll have a much better idea of what
is involved in using the rest of the data we want from
their system. (and of how to deal with Jerry). Had we
needed everything we went looking for, for successful
completion of the initial project, we would have been even
worse off. We simply hadn't planned for encountering this
kind of problem.
A stock solution to this type of problem would be to
make formal project requests of each group for needed
assistance. This gives them. the incentive to help, and
covers us if they don't, since our project completion can
be made contingent on the completion of all the others.
But we would be left to suffer with any delays they should
choose to put into their schedule, and we were hoping for
speed as well as success. Rather than ensuring success,
this method merely avoids blame for failure. It also
doesn't solve other problems, such as our being perceived
as a threat. It would take extremely good project specifi-
cation to nake this solution work if the other group vants
us to fail, since results of the request depend on its
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interpretation. No reward systen is going to make then
cooperate fully if they perceive us as a threat.
Despite the fact that everyone in MIS is iCeally
supposed to be on the same team, it isn't any more true
than saying all of the d'epartrcnts in the firm are on the
same team. The organization and the reward structure give
each group its own goals that aren't truly meshed with
those of other groups.
A Model for Analvsis
In order to adapt the work of political and social
risk analysis to the problems of CIS impleirentors, I would
like to draw an analogy. Let us assume that each depart-
ment will be a country for purposes of the model, and the
MIS group setting out to implement a CIS is an inter-
national firm. The MIS department will then be the home
country. In order for our firm to do business, it must
have a product that someone in the other country wants (a
system).
While there, they will be forced to obey the laws of
that country. (Since the staff is not moving permanently,
but only working there, they had better obey the home
country laws as well.) To help the firm become successful,
and remain around for a while, they probably don't want to
simply obey the laws, but to try to fit in to the environ-
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ment. They will want to pay attention to the Lolitical and
social background
the financial and
this foreign firm
I think this
interaction that
to cover a lot of
problem. The MIS
(data processing)
the citizens of
don't. Too often,
host country when
they find themselves in, rather than just
econor-ic. They will perhars try to mold
to be a model citizen.
is a pretty sound model for much of the
an 1IS group gets involved in. It extends
interesting points, such as the language
citizens all speak the same language
although perhaps different dialects, but
the host country (department) usually
MIS-ers forget to use the language of the
they are away from MIS-land on business.
Many of them don't even bother to learn the language of the
country they are working in, which can cause some major
communication problems (even though once upon a time the
languages of all these countries sprang from a cormon
tongue).
For programmers or others in IIIS to deal with accoun-
tants, they should know some accounting. They don't have
have to become accountants, but they must learn the termi-
nology well enough to communicate.. They must be able to
understand questions and be able to make their replies
understood. And while it would be nice if everyone in the
firm knew some data processing, MIS is most often the
intruder, so the burden is on them to be able to explain
-101-
the necessary cata irocessing concepts.
The analogy holds for many of the problems that we ran
into in rewritingj CAS. W'e were so Lusy making sure that we
and our product were accepted by CAD's government and
citizenry, that we forgot to worry about suppliers in our
home country. The help we needed at home, of course, was
technical assistance with interfaces and feeder systems.
My intent is not to push the model, but to suggest the
validity of borrowing the techniques being developed for
international firms, for application to CIS development
efforts. Recent work in evaluation of investments in other
countries has begun to nake people realize that you can't
limit project evaluation to economic factors alone. It has
been necessary to try to find ways to incorporate social
and political factors into investment decisions. Situa-
tions like the recent upheaval in Iran have pointed out the
need for a better understanding of those non-economic
issues. Any U.S. investment in Iran at that point was
probably in an unprofitable position regardless of, the
economic value of the project, because of purely political/
social reasons. If your company is shut down or taken over
by a foreign government, it doesn't make much difference
how profitable you expected it to be. (Again, the threat
of expropriation corresponds to decentralization in the
model -- a takeover of the facility by the foreign
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government.)
Structured Method of Pnalysis
Political scientists, in response, have been trying to
develop structured methods for looking at the non-quantifi-
able areas that can irmpact the firm. Some of the work has
been based on attempts to quantify political and social
variables, usually through polling expert opinion. The
more interesting work, however, simply attempts to provide
enough structure to force you to think about all of the
important issues. The idea is not to find one ideal list
of problems to avoid, but to identify how to structure your
planning to be sure and consider all the issues. An indi-
vidual analyst might then use that to develop a particular
scheme that works well for her or himself. This will
probably amount to some kind of checklist or table as a
basis for an initial analysis.
With data processing projects like CAS, we begin to
see the need more and more for some such political/ social
analysis. Although the specific variables they are ooking
at are different, the approach of the political scientists
is applicable to a similar analysis of a CIS implemen-
tation. As with foreign investment, until recently evalua-
tion of CIS projects has rested almost entirely on economic
cost/ benefit analysis. I don't hope to offer a complete
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solution, but perhaps making7 use of their work will give us
some insights into CIS implementation problems.
For a CIS, the analysis r-ight be done in four parts.
First, we might list the actors in each of three cate-
gories: users, suppliers, support groups. Users of the
system are those who receive copies of reports or have on-
line access. They might be further classified as primary
(major) users (usually those who control access to the
data), important secondary users, and tertiary or less
important secondary users. CAS was structured in such a
way that only two groups would be identified in this anal-
ysis -- the primary users being CAD, and secondary users
being all of roughly equal importance to us.
We should separately identify suppliers of input to
the system if they are not users. They may be divided to
direct suppliers, and indirect suppliers, on the basis of
whether they provide the information only to this system,
or provide it to another use which then feeds this one.
CAS had known problems in this area. The only direct
supplier to CAS was the primary user, but the input from
secondary sources was already known to be inaccurate.
Validity of CAS results depends on the quality of infor-
mation extracted from other systems. Improving the inputs
from these suppliers could thus improve CAD's product.
For the third category, we need to list the technical
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crouns vho will be Effected. CAS nceded support from.
feeder system support groups, from technical support groups
(ADjBAS, rAMIS, CICS, etc.), and fror data processing
operations to run online.
Next, the system should be evaluated on its own. Is
it important to the organization? Is it a major drain on
machine or people resources? Does its operation affect
other systems? And do other systems likewise affect it?
What kind of information base does it contain? Is that a
large or small amount of data? Is it widely known
information or a closely guarded secret? Will the system
affect the way the data is distributed in the organization?
Will someone have access to more information as a result of
this system? Is the systen simple or complicated to use?
to run? to maintain? How will the new system compare on
these points with whatever it replaces?
The answers to these questions establish the inherent
impact of the system. Since data is a major source of
power in an organization, the data content and access to it
can largely determine the potential of the system to hit
political obstacles. While even a small amount of rela-
tively unimportant information can bring on problems, put-
ting the complete financial reports of the firm into an
online system with unlimited access is a sure-fire trouble
maker.
Thirdly, we neec to go biac; to the list of actors, Ind
using the previous analysis, decide whether the system will
have a positive impact, a negative impact, or no irmpact on
each actor. Some of the results may be mixed. A systen
may require more effort of a department, but bring them
more power in terms of additional access to data. Or
access may be restricted to some due to the importance of
the data now being collected. But if we can identify the
major issues this way, we are a lot closer to being able to
plan for them. By isolating specific potential trouble
spots, it can alert the implerentor before problems arise.
Finally, we should go back and look at how powerful
the actor affected is, and how much he will be affected, to
determine the overall issues. If actor A is likely to be
unhappy, but his boss will benefit, there may be other
factors acting to balance the added burden on him. If
overall, actor A gains and actor B loses, perhaps we can
arrange some kind of trade of benefits, with A doing
something else for B. If the actor who gains isn't in a
position of power over the loser, the system is probably in
trouble, unless we can find some mechanism for equalizing
benefits. In the case where there are just too many or too
important losers, the system stands no chance. For
example, if we had examined in advance our relationship
with OAE, we could have recognized both the threat we
posed, and the lack of incentive that they had to help us.
We might then have modified our approach to them and
improved our chance of successful dealings with them.
I believe that this type of structured analysis of
political and social issues, done beforehand, could prevent
a lot of CIS implementation failures, because it allows you
to plan around problems before they arise, giving the
project the best possible chance. While CAS was not a
complete failure, we would have been alerted to many of our
oversights, and could probably through better planning have
averted many of the delays we experienced. Many systems
with little chance of success due to political and social
factors within the firm might be redesigned or never
atteripted at all. By lowering the failure rate of systems
this way, we might further improve relations with user
departments and make still more gains on future projects.
Conclusions
The computer system designer/ implementor today faces
many problems. They tend to center more and more around
the "people" aspects of the system. Current literature
points out many of the potential stumbling blocks in
dealing with users, but gives the analyst little to help
organize and plan around people problems.
A structured approach to analysis will help to uncover
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pitf-alls in advance or avoid thei altogcethcr. Published
structured design methodologies cover technical design well
and economic valuation to sone extent.. But the people
issues are for the most part untouched. I propose
integrating a more comprehensive structured evaluation of
political and social issues into such a methodology. At an
early phase in the project life cycle, the effects of the
proposed system on all of the actors should be evaluated.
What we have to be particularly sensitive to, as seen
with CAS, is problems at hone. The literature has
sensitized analysts much more to user problems than to
intra-departmental problems. There is, however, a large
potential for such intra-MIS conflict in an organization
like Worldwide's. So we must be at least as aware of those
problems as we are of the ones with users.
The structure of many data processing departments is
like that at Worldwide. With the increasing amount of
interdependent systems and the use of advanced software
tools, this structure is becoming inadequate. It is no
longer able to reward people appropiately for their work
because the systems have become more complicated than the
organization. A matrixed organization should probably be
adopted. A task force structure for projects which cross
system lines is justified on the same basis that task
forces have been set up across departmental lines in the
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rest of the organization. This woul allow a 'eward struc-
ture that provides incentives for intra-group assistance.
Hopefully by doing upfront political/ social analysis,
we will not only uncover problems, but be able to find ways
to avoid them. Whenever possible, changes should be
planned, along with any incentives needed to elicit cooper-
ation. For some problers, simple steps such as documen-
tation may be sufficient to greatly improve results. As
with OAE, interviews may become much more satisfactory if
you let it be known that the discussion is going into a
memo-, and will be distributed to others. The memo provides
exposure -- good or bad depending on their response at the
time.
The critical point is to be able to know where to
expect problems, in order to be able to plan for them.
Being caught off guard, especially during early develop-
ment, is apt to cause a major setback to your system. The
way systems in general are headed, it will increasingly be
political and social issues that pose the biggest threats.
A structured analysis can prepare you for an OAE or a
database group that isn't willing to cooperate. Hopefully,
forewarned you will be able to develop a solution in time.
And more successful impleentations will be the result.
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APPENDIXN
SOME NOTES ON. THE ENVIRONENT
At this point, I would like to try to clear up some
points that seem to require further explanation. While I
don't believe that the environment at Worldwide is very
unusual, it perhaps fits less well into a description of a
"typical" data processing shop in some specific areas than
in others.
Production Systems
The process of putting a system into "production" is
probably not too clear. It involves a number of things
that would probably best be done by a well trained clerk
instead of a programmer. It is a time consuming, detail
oriented job, that must be completed for an operations
clerk to be able to run the system. (In some organiza-
tions, in fact, the position of data processing "librarian"
has recently begun to appear as a part of system devel-
opment teams.) There are a large number of standard forms
that have to be filled out. These are intended to allow
the clerks in DPD to correctly plan and schedule jobs, set
up inputs, verify and distribute reports, etc. They are
necessarily quite detailed, including file names, report
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names, and names and locations of support programmers and
those who are to receive reports.
Completing the forms and getting them typed correctly
is time consuming and not very challenging (mentally, at
least). Because MIS typists turn over even faster than
programmers, they seldom remain long enough to be very
familiar with data processing terminology and formats. For
instance, IBM Job Control Lancuage instructions (JCL) must
be typed exactly as written, with all capital letters and
spaces in the right places. Most typists at first, being
unaware that there is a difference, treat JCL like all
programmer scribbles, using lowercase, spaces, and better
punctuation to make it look more like English.
The result is that forms are often corrected and
brought back for retyping several times before they are
acceptable. After a complete set of forms is ready, it is
sent to DPD for review, along with copies of successful
test runs. After 3-6 weeks, DPD is required to either
accept the programs to be run in production tests, or
return the documentation with an explanation of why it was
rejected (this is usually missing forms, mistyped JCL, or
instructions that are difficult to follow).
CAS is even more of a problem than most systems. With
several incoming files from other systems, its documen-
tation must be updated every time the other systems are
changed. Program chng:-ices and cianing TIS standards have-
regularly caused changes in descriptions, sizes of
temporary files, program run times, report titles, etc.
Even such things as program names changed frequently until
we set up standards for the system.
Contract Procgrar:ers
The use of contract prograrmers at Worldwide is
cited as a problem area, perhaps unfairly. Contract pro-
grammers are widely used in the industry to meet short term
staffing needs. Programmers are often a scarce resource in
firms, so a project will be forced to go to outside help to
meet temporary staffing needs. This is normally confined
to the actual programming phase of a project, where there
is a large volume of work and little knowledge of the com-
pany is required.
Contract programmers in general aren't expected to
have the dedication to the firm or to the specific project
that a company staff member might have. Because of the
short time they are assigned to a firm, they supposedly
don't care about the long term viability of their problem
solutions. The fact that they will probably be assigned to
a project only during the development stage is said to make
them indifferent as to how well the completed program will
run. Their concern is thought to be only with short term
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successes and moeetinc specific currnt goals. Because of
their short stays, they are not expected to know or to
learn the non-data processing skills neccssary to write
good systems (such as good accounting practices for finan-
cial systems).
But, at a firm where the "permanent" staff is no more
permanent than the contractors, most of these arguments
don't hold. (Contract programm-ers at Worldwide actually
remain longer on average than IS staff.) Contractors can
often be selected from several that are available, and
chosen for specific needed skills. They are generally
better paid by their own firms than regular MIS staff.
Therefore, better quality people are found there than
through the personnel hiring process. And some of them
definitely do care about their projects. They care about
producing good work anyway, and want a good reputation to
follow them later. Call-backs and referrals are important
to their standing in the firms that sell their services.
Computer Service Chargeback
As Gibson and Nolan (1974) and others have pointed
out, chargeback of computer services should normally begin
very early in the life of a data processing department.
Cost information is critical to the evaluation of the
relative merits of any two proposed solutions to a problem.
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Without cost chargeback, the oranization has no fair :ay
to decide which projects should be undertaken, and their
computer systems will tend to ref lect the political power
of various user departments, rather than reflecting the
value of particular applications to the firm.
Worldwide has managed somehow to continue without
charging for computer services. They have developed a
respectable set of computer applications, but no one really
knows what the cost has been.
SMD attempts to judge systems by their dollar value to
the company, but their analysis suffers from a lack of real
cost data because there is no billing for computer
services. Where other firms record usage of the computer,
storage space (tapes and disks), and supplies of paper,
etc., and bill the users in detail, Worldwide has chosen to
ignore this possibility. Instead, they rely on the limited
ability of CAS to allocate the cost of data processing to
departments. MIS expenses show up as a single overhead
item (some $15 million a year), allocated on the basis of
some departmental workload measures in user areas.
Instead of bills, the user managers receive highly
summarized reports of computer usage, giving only the total
CPU usage in hours and total number of jobs run for the
quarter. No attempt is made to relate cost to those
figures or to charge for usage. In fact, our user Rob
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West, compares his rerort w;ith other managers' totals and
complains when his "share" of available resources isn't
used. When we were trying to convince him that rewriting
CAS was necessary, one of his arguments was that we weren't
using nearly as much CPU time as CAE was (at that point his
figures already showed us with several hundred CPU hours
for CAS for the year -- which would amount to a sizeable
bill other places). Ie didn't feel that OAE was any more
important to Worldwide than CAS. Therefore, in his opinion
we deserved to use at least as much resources as they did.
It didn't matter to him that they ran 30 times as many jobs
as we did and produced many more reports.
This lack of awareness of the cost of computer ser-
vices makes SMD's cost-benefit difficult to estimate (due
to lack of figures) and still more difficult to demonstrate
(what is the cost to a manager of a free service?).
Sum-any T 4 Armin cronyms
and Terminology
ADABAS
APD
CAD
CAS
CICS
CIS
COBOL
DBMS
DPD
E-R
Extracts
IBM
MIS
OAE
RAMIS
PL/1
SMD
Technology
TSO
DDMS used for our large data files.
Applications Programmring Department, a part
of MIS.
Cost Analysis Departatent, p rimary users of
the Cost Analysis System.
Cost Analysis System, used to refer to the
systen ancd the rocramrrinc group assicgned
to it.
On-line terrinal monitor program available on
user terminals.
Computerized Information System.
Computer programming language used in extracts.
Data Base Management System.
Data Processing Department, a part of MIS.
Entity-Relationship method for database design.
The front end of CAS, programs collect and
convert feeder system data for allocation.
Manufacturer of most computer hardware at
Worldwide, also provides much of the systems
software.
Management Information Systems, a division
of Worldwide Insurance.
A CIS and the support group for it in APD.
Provides three input files to CAS.
DBMS used by CAS for smaller data files.
Programming language used in the new CAS.
Systems Management Department, a part of IS.
Systems Technology Department, a part of MIS.
On-line terminal monitor program available on
programmer terminals.
Ficure 8
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POS T SCRIPT
On May 5, a memo was released in MIS announcing a reorg-an-
ization of the departLIent. Among other changes, SMD was
officially resurrected, but as a part of each APD group.
Existing SMD representatives were reassiened to the APD
managers that they supported (an effective downgrading of
their status, since forrrly they were considered cquals of
those group managers.) At the same time, we heard unoffi-
cially of a "minor" corporate restructuring to take place
soon.
On May 6, Rob West announced that he was leaving for a new
job. By the time he had left, Anne had given notice as
well. Dick, also on Rlob's staff, transferred to the Finan-
cial Systems group that Sue was in. He was to support some
of Rob's work from that area. But, after less than a week,
he too announced his intention to leave Worldwide.
At the end of May, our original contacts in the RAIS and
ADABAS support groups left within a week of each other.
Andy moved to Technology the first week in June. Brad and
Stan are both actively looking for jobs. I left Worldwide
at the end of June, on the planned completion date of CAS.
The project to develop a consistent corporate-wide num-
bering scheme is still "being considered". Chances are
that it will be "considered" until everyone involved has
left or lost interest.
I expect that CAS will be completed by the end of the
sunmer. This is somewhat behind schedule, but CAS has
already proven enough to the firm that they will procecd
with our long range plans. An advanced development group,
headed by Lou, has been set up to begin plans for conver-
sion of the next financial systcm. CAS has essentially no
users at this point, but it has the support of top
management, so it is expected that Rob's replacement will
have an interest in making use of the system.
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